The pattern of self-reflectiveness in dream reports.

Abstract

Shifts in levels of self-reflectiveness (SR) across a series of dream reports have been theoretically linked to psychological development. The hypothesized pattern is one of a linear increase in SR. Development of SR within a single dream report has not been addressed and is investigated in the present study. Dream reports, collected in the context of an experimental manipulation to increase dream SR, were broken down into textual information units. Each unit was assigned an SR score and the resulting sequences of SR scores were analyzed. Singlemindedness was found to be a stable aspect of dreaming. The treatment conditions increased the maximum SR reached in the dream reports of the experimental groups and some evidence of group differences in the pattern of changes in SR were found. It was concluded that the induction of lucid dreaming increases maximum levels of SR attained in the dream but does not markedly disrupt the serial organization of SR in dream reports.

The phenomenology of REM-sleep dreaming: The contributions of personal and perspectival ownership, subjective temporality, and episodic memory.

“…Recounting all the explanations offered for dream-source misidentification would be prohibitive, but those currently receiving serious attention include (a) reduced capacity to evaluate, monitor, and reflect on content in consciousness (e.g., Darling, Hoffmann, Moffitt, & Purcell, 1993; Hobson, 2009; Nir & Tononi, 2010); (b) limited availability of memories that would provide a context within which to evaluate the bizarre content of the dream (e.g., Hobson & Friston, 2012; Foulkes, 1985; MacDuffie & Mashour, 2010; McNamara et al, 2007; Tranquillo, 2014); (c) impairment of mechanisms that would allow the dreamer to identify the hallucinatory quality of dream content (e.g., Hobson, 1999; Occhionero, Cicogna, Natale, Esposito, & Bosinelli, 2005; Tranquillo, 2014; Zippel, 2016); (d) diminished capacity of the dreamer to engage in logical reasoning (e.g., Maquet et al, 2005); (e) regression to a rudimentary form of consciousness (i.e., protoconsciousness) that cannot support reflective thought (e.g., Hobson, 2009; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000; Solms, 2013); and (f) restricted access to “mental activeness,” a psychological trait that enables the dreamer to diagnose the compromised character of his or her phenomenology (e.g., O’Shaughnessy, 2000).…”