The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre‐War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

Abstract

Prewar U.S. intelligence suggested that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. None were found in Iraq. The threat they posed proved to be illusory and not imminent. Was Iraq a case of intelligence failure? In his seminal 1978 study of the inevitability of intelligence failure, Richard Betts argued that the most crucial mistakes are most often made by decision‐making consumers. Through analyses of the findings of the reports of the 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and President Bush’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, this article finds failures occurring at numerous points across the intelligence cycle including, despite the conclusions of these two inquiries, the policy‐maker level. Although issues surrounding these shortcomings remain keenly contested and a full explanation will only be possible once the role of policy makers has been scrutinized, the analysis provides a rare window through which analysts may better understand the dynamics of intelligence failure.

Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11

“…Neoconservatives and their allies also pressured intelligence agencies and analysts to validate their claims, such as the story that Saddam Hussein attempted to acquire yellowcake uranium from Niger and that Saddam Hussein was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (Phythian 2006). Information on the threats that Saddam's regime posed was coupled with assurances that removing him would be relatively straightforward, while Iraqi oil together with the INC would cheaply reconstruct the country.…”

“…Information on the threats that Saddam's regime posed was coupled with assurances that removing him would be relatively straightforward, while Iraqi oil together with the INC would cheaply reconstruct the country. Intelligence and assessments of war costs that contradicted the neoconservative line were ignored or buried (Kaufmann 2004; Packer 2005; Phythian 2006).…”

Amerikanische Außenpolitik im Zeichen des „Krieges gegen den Terror“

“…Kaufmann weist in seiner Studie sehr überzeugend nach, dass die bush-regierung die bedrohung durch den irak zwischen 2002 und 2003 dramatisierte, wobei diese Form der Manipulation nicht durch das Versagen von Geheimdiensten oder andere externe umstände zu erklären sei, sondern gezielt eingesetzt wurde. hieran schließt sich die untersuchung von Mark Phythian (2006) an, der insbesondere den Zusammenhang zwischen Geheimdienstinformationen und getroffenen politischen entscheidungen aufgreift. er bezweifelt ebenfalls, dass die fehlerhaften informationen und insbesondere die hieraus abgeleiteten entscheidungen lediglich auf ein Versagen der Geheimdienste zurückzuführen sind.…”

The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post‐Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy1

“…Divided government could play a part: a Democratic Congress, remembering Iraq, would likely act as a check on a Republican president's ambitions for bold moves unless an unarguable emergency were at hand. A president who seeks to get his way in dealings with Congress by reference to secret intelligence in the hands of the executive will inherit a poisonous legacy of distrust from the Bush Administration, which has tainted both the intelligence services and the political context in which they operate (Phythian 2006). The extent to which the U.S. government recovers its fiscal health may play a part in such decisions, as will the speed at which the U.S. military manages to rebuild its morale and the quality of its manpower, which has been sorely tested by the strain of an unexpectedly lengthy and sizeable deployment in Iraq.…”