The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far

Mizrahi, Moti

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0138-3

Cited by 84 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Wray also points out in a footnote that "this is a pessimistic induction of the sort that Laudan (1984) develops." I have argued elsewhere that the pessimistic induction is a fallacious argument (Mizrahi 2012b). Here I would like to make a slightly different point.…”

Section: A Refutation By Logical Analogymentioning

confidence: 90%

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The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

Mizrahi¹

2013

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Abstract:In this paper, through a critical examination of Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call "relative realism," preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.

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Section: A Refutation By Logical Analogymentioning

confidence: 90%

“…That is to say, the sample of theories in this inductive generalization from a sample is not sufficiently uniform for projecting the property of "being false" from past theories to current theories (Mizrahi 2012b). Similarly, the following inductive argument is also a bad inductive generalization:…”

Section: A Refutation By Logical Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

Mizrahi¹

2013

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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“…Second, they are more successful than distant past theories. Jarrett Leplin (1997: 141), Gerald Doppelt, (2007: 111), Juha Saatsi (2009: 358), Michael Devitt (2011: 292), Park (2011: 80), Fahrbach (2011bFahrbach ( : 1290, and Mizrahi (2013) note that scientific theories have been becoming more successful. For these two reasons, it is not a negligible mistake to omit recent past theories.…”

Section: The Pessimistic Induction Over Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?

Park

2016

Found Sci

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The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincaré, 1905(Poincaré, /1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (i) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (ii) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (iii) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early 20 th century to the early 21 st century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early 21 st century to the early 22 nd century.

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“…I then argue that the burden is on pessimists to justify the choice of the uniformity principle over the disuniformity principle. In Section 4, I explicate how my criticism against the pessimistic induction differs from the criticism (Fahrbach 2011;Park, 2011a;Mizrahi, 2013a) that the pessimistic induction commits the fallacy of biased sample. In Section 5, I argue that my criticism against the pessimistic induction is on the same boat as the argument from underconsideration (van Fraassen, 1989;Ladyman et al, 1997;Khalifa, 2010;Wray, 2008;Wray, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle

Park

2016

Acta Anal

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The pessimistic induction is built upon the uniformity principle that the future resembles the past. In daily scientific activities, however, scientists sometimes rely on what I call the disuniformity principle that the future differs from the past. They do not give up their research projects despite the repeated failures. They believe that they will succeed although they failed repeatedly, and as a result they achieve what they intended to achieve. Given that the disuniformity principle is useful in certain cases in science, we might reasonably use it to infer that present theories are true unlike past theories. Hence, pessimists have the burden to show that our prediction about the fate of present theories is more likely to be true if we use the uniformity principle than if we use the disuniformity principle.

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The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far

Cited by 84 publications

References 25 publications

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?

The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle

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