The phenomenology of suffering in medicine and bioethics

Abstract

This article develops a phenomenology of suffering with an emphasis on matters relevant to medical practice and bioethics. An attempt is made to explain how suffering can involve many different things-bodily pains, inability to carry out everyday actions, and failure to realize core life values-and yet be a distinct phenomenon. Proceeding from and expanding upon analyses found in the works of Eric Cassell and Elaine Scarry, suffering is found to be a potentially alienating mood overcoming the person and engaging her in a struggle to remain at home in the face of loss of meaning and purpose in life. Suffering involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected through the suffering-mood but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about (1) my embodiment, (2) my engagements in the world together with others, and (3) my core life values. Suffering is in essence a feeling (a mood), but as such, it has implications for and involves the person's entire life: how she acts in the world, communicates with others, and understands and looks upon her priorities and goals in life. Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way. In such situations, we are not focused directly upon the suffering-mood-as in the cases of pain and other bodily ailments-but rather, upon the things that the mood presents to us: not only our bodies, but also other things in the world that prevent us from having a good life and being the persons we want to be. Such suffering may in many cases be transformed or at least mitigated by a person's identifying and changing her core life values and in such a manner reinterpreting her life story to become an easier and more rewarding one to live under the present circumstances.

Phenomenology of pregnancy and the ethics of abortion

“…From a phenomenological perspective suffering could be viewed as a painfully attuned being-in-the-world separating a person from her goals and potentials in life (Svenaeus 2014). Such a mood (or combination of moods) involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about, firstly, the person’s embodiment, secondly, her engagements in the world together with others, and, thirdly, her core life-narrative values.…”

“…It is essential for medicine and bioethics to discern these different layers of suffering and how they are connected through the suffering-mood (Svenaeus 2014). Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way.…”

“…I am currently unable to make the estimation, but I think this way of approaching the ethics of prenatal diagnostics for DS would be the best way to proceed. In making such an estimation, it should be kept in mind that the content moods or even happy moods, which persons with DS appear to standardly enjoy, clearly counts against considering such a life as fraught with suffering from the phenomenological perspective, despite the fact that important ways to flourish may be closed as a result of intellectual disabilities (Svenaeus 2014). …”

The phenomenology of chronic pain: embodiment and alienation

“…Pain, like an intrusive stranger, forces us by a centripetal force to let everything else go. 32 The world of the person in pain, consequently, is a world that 27 See Goldie (1990) and Svenaeus (2014). 28 See Ratcliffe (2008: 105 ff.…”

“…12 Regarding the phenomenology of pain in Husserl, see Geniusas (2014). 13 For some historical and more recent exceptions to this negligence, see Bullington (2009), Buytendijk (1948, Carel (2008), Grüni (2004), Leder (1984Leder ( -1985Leder ( , 1990, Sartre (1956), Serrano de Haro (2012), and Svenaeus (2011Svenaeus ( , 2014. 14 See Gallagher (2005).…”