The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill

Ryan, Alan

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26452-0

Cited by 64 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…6 Ryan "relate[s] Utilitarianism to the System of Logic and to the last of the Essays of Some Unsettled Questions on Political Economy, out of which one can reconstruct the argument which leads him to say that proof is impossible." 7 ese are the passages, which focus on the distinction between art and science, that we will consider in section 2. Ryan claims that Mill holds that "the reason why evaluative judgments are not capable of proof is that they are not factual statements; indeed they are not really statements at all."…”

Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ryan claims that Mill holds that "the reason why evaluative judgments are not capable of proof is that they are not factual statements; indeed they are not really statements at all." 8 Ryan's position is that Mill could not have meant to prove the utility principle, because he does not believe that the utility principle is truth-amenable. As he writes in the 1974 J. S. Mill, "'proved' is a shorthand for 'proved true', and whatever cannot be true can hardly be proved true."…”

Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 e vindication of Mill's statement that there can be no proof of ultimate ends rests in the fact that a proposition like "Happiness is the supreme good" is not, as its grammatical form suggests, a statement at all, but an imperative -"Seek happiness" -and is not susceptible of either truth or falsity. 10 Ryan sees this noncognitivist reading beyond a mere analysis of the "proof," however, interpolating an entire metaethical foundation for Mill. He remarks upon "how closely Mill's account resembles that given by 'prescriptivists' such as Hare," 11 and offers a universalist parsing of "stealing is wrong" as "let no-one steal" on behalf of Mill.…”

Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

Macleod¹

2013

The Southern J of Philosophy

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In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical noncognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin by laying out the "received view" of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. I then argue that there is no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on "art" and "science" do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, a noncognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism and is difficult to reconcile with the clear commitment in Utilitarianism to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.

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Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: E Noncognitivist Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

Macleod¹

2013

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…In the Utility satisfaction hypothesis, humans in every society aim at ensuring moral uprightness-what Plato calls the "Summum Bonum" (Schofield, 2006). Within utilitarian rumination, moral uprightness would denote man's highest pursuit for quality and excellence, which John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism refers to as "happiness or pleasure" (Ryan, 1990;Donner, 1991). Utility satisfaction is therefore a yardstick for moral evaluation and moral direction that expands into a measure or standard of moral value (Long, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Student Expectations and Quality of Postgraduate Education: The Case for Public Universities in Uganda

Kaggwa¹,

Sekiwu²,

Naluwemba³

2017

ASSRJ

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In order to chant John Stuart Mill’s Utility Theory in Service Delivery, this study focuses on the quality of student support in Postgraduate Education at Makerere University’s College of Education and External Studies (CEES). Using 50 Masters’ and Doctoral Student respondents, the study investigated an alleged gap between students’ expectations and experiences of service quality in Postgraduate programs offered by the College. Four dimensions play a cardinal role in the measurement of student support service quality in postgraduate education, namely supervision support, infrastructure, administrative support, and academic facilitation. The 4-dimensions are student dissatisfiers necessitating interventions to improve quality. From the Step-Wise Regression computations, support supervision and administrative support are the most important determinants of quality postgraduate support. As recommendations, support supervision and administrative support must be targeted as drivers of quality student support at this level. The Utilitarian Theory, if well-integrated, provides moral bounds in which quality support systems could be optimally scaled up.

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“…Mill's account of fallacies restated such Socratic ambitions in a modern idiom. See Jackson 1941;Anschutz 1953;Ryan 1987;Skorupski 1989;Scarre 1989. For a discussion of Mill on fallacies, see Hansen 1997: 125-43.…”

Section: VImentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophy of Error and Liberty of Thought: J.S. Mill on Logical Fallacies

Rosen

2008

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Most recent discussions of John Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1843) neglect the fifth book concerned with logical fallacies. Mill not only follows the revival of interest in the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of fallacies in Richard Whately and Augustus De Morgan, but he also develops new categories and an original analysis which enhance the study of fallacies within the context of what he calls 'the philosophy of error'. After an exploration of this approach, the essay relates the philosophy of error to the discussion of truth and error in chapter two of On Liberty (1859) concerned with freedom of thought and discussion. Drawing on Socratic and Baconian perspectives, Mill defends both the traditional study of logic against Jevons, Boole, De Morgan, and others, as well as the study of fallacies as the key to maintaining truth and its dissemination in numerous fields, such as science, morality, politics, and religion. In Mill's view the study of fallacies also liberates ordinary people to explore the truth and falsity of ideas and, as such, to participate in society and politics and develop themselves as progressive beings.

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The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill

Cited by 64 publications

References 0 publications

Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

Student Expectations and Quality of Postgraduate Education: The Case for Public Universities in Uganda

The Philosophy of Error and Liberty of Thought: J.S. Mill on Logical Fallacies

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