The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes: Comment

Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees

“…Both studies conclude that external members appear to have different voting patterns than internal ones, tend to dissent more frequently, and-when they dissent-are more likely to vote for a lower interest rate. These results mirror the ones obtained by the literature on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which usually finds that Federal Reserve Board members appear to prefer more expansionary policy than the Reserve Bank presidents (see Belden 1989, Gildea 1990, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990, and Havrilesky and Gildea 1991. The aforementioned literature uses dissenting votes only and analyzes differences in the voting behavior of the two groups by comparing dissenting frequencies.…”

Regional Influences on U.S. Monetary Policy: Some Implications for Europe

“…This theory generally assumes that political factors are important determinants of behaviour; more specifically, Democrats and Republicans occupy different points on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, with Democrats presumed to be less attentive to inflation and more attentive to unemployme nt than Republicans. Numerous prior studies of Federal Reserve voting -including articles by Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991, 1992, 1995, and Gildea (1990Gildea ( , 1992 -have examined monetary policy votes cast by U.S. central bankers at the institutional hub, at the spokes, or both.…”

Superstar Central Bankers

“…They find that former central bank staff members who have been promoted to sit on the policy committee prefer lower inflation than other members. Likewise, Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991a), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991b), and Harris et al (2011) find that experience in government, in the central bank, in the industry sector, and in academia appears to be a source of variation in policy preferences. Farvaque et al (2011) use data from OECD countries and show that policymakers' background influences inflation and the effect of policymakers' experience is stronger in countries adopting inflation targeting.…”