The Political Consequences of Center-Led Redistribution in Brazilian Federalism: The Fall of Subnational Party Machines

Borges, André

doi:10.1353/lar.2011.0047

Cited by 80 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Note-se que antes da chegada à presidência, tanto o pT quanto o pSDB tinham organizações partidárias relativamente mais frágeis fora das regiões mais desenvolvidas, o Sul e o Sudeste. Nas regiões Norte e Nordeste, muitos estados estavam sob firme controle de famílias e lideranças políti-cas conservadoras, cujas máquinas partidárias, não raro, haviam sido criadas ainda no regime militar (Borges, 2011;Montero, 2009). Não por acaso, quando da sua campanha presidencial em 1994, o candidato F. H. Cardoso realizou uma aliança prioritária com o pFL, partido que possuía base eleitoral concentrada no Nordeste, de modo a compensar a debilidade do pSDB naquela região.…”

Section: Competição Vertical E Políticas Sociais No Federalismounclassified

Eleições presidenciais, federalismo e política social

Borges¹

2013

Rev. bras. Ci. Soc.

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Section: Competição Vertical E Políticas Sociais No Federalismounclassified

Eleições presidenciais, federalismo e política social

Borges¹

2013

Rev. bras. Ci. Soc.

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“…5 Evidence for institutional engineering is provided by Calvo and Micozzi (2005). 6 The role of clientelism and particularistic resources is emphasized by Borges (2011), as well as Cornelius (1999). Holzner (2010: 124) mentions both mechanisms.…”

Section: Measuring Institutional Incongruence: the System Dissimilarimentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Institutions Beyond the Nation State: Measuring Institutional Dissimilarity in Federal Countries

Harbers¹,

Ingram²

2013

Gov. & oppos.

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The persistence of subnational undemocratic regimes in new democracies has recently revived interest in intra-national patterns of democratization. This article offers new data and a methodological contribution to this literature, emphasizing the measurement of institutional variation across territorial units and levels of government. Developing new measures of the unevenness of democratic institutions within individual countries, and illustrating these measures with an original data set on electoral rules in Mexico at the federal level and across 32 subnational units, we provide tools to enhance the study of democracy, particularly at the subnational level and in federal or decentralized systems. More specifically, we develop measures of institutional characteristics across a country's spatial units and of federal-to-state institutional dissimilarity – what we call system-wide institutional incongruence.

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“…A substantial body of research suggests that Latin American federalism is an important barrier to transformative policies to redistribute income in the region (Gibson 2004;Díaz-Cayeros 2006;Borges 2013). In this article we focus on a distinct set of institutional constraints on the scope of redistributive efforts in Latin America's federations: the role of economic geography in shaping the relative weight of territories versus citizens in the organization of fiscal structures.…”

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“…Tellingly, the most successful example of redistributive policy in Brazil, Bolsa Família, has had a large impact on poverty precisely because it delivers resources straight to mayors rather than through governors (Fenwick 2009). Opportunities to transform Brazil's redistributive equilibrium have depended fundamentally on electoral opportunities to tear down existing state patronage networks linked to malapportionment (Borges 2013). …”

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Barriers to Egalitarianism: Distributive Tensions in Latin American Federations

Beramendi

Rogers

Díaz-Cayeros

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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Latin America's largest federations have significantly reduced their levels of income inequality in recent years, perhaps reflecting a structural change toward egalitarianism. However, we argue that the political geography of federalism in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico strongly shapes preferences against centralized redistribution likely to promote equity in the long term. While federalism does not necessary lead to lower redistribution in theory, the geographic spread of income and malapportioned political institutions limit egalitarianism in these nations. These dynamics help explain why fiscal structures are distinct in Latin American federations as compared to federations in high-income countries. First, we show that the territorial structure of inequality and malapportionment are associated with lower redistributive effort in the global context and that the Latin American federations have extreme values for both variables. Second, using a new data set of income distributions within and across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico over time, we demonstrate that the conditions that favor fiscal transfers from the national to subnational governments are consistently strong, but conditions are rarely favorable for centralized policies to equilibrate national income. Unequal income patterns are reinforced by legislative malapportionment, which encourages interregional transfers to regions and limits the political voice of more populated and unequal regions that would benefit from centralized redistribution.Las federaciones más grandes de América Latina han reducido significativamente sus niveles de desigualdad de ingresos en los últimos años, lo que quizás refleja un cambio estructural hacia el igualitarismo. Sin embargo, este estudio argumenta que la geografía política del federalismo en Argentina, Brasil y México moldea fuertemente las preferencias en contra de la redistribución centralizada que promueve la equidad a largo plazo. Aunque, en teoría, el federalismo no necesariamente reduce la redistribución, la distribución geográfica de los ingresos y la representación desproporcionada de las instituciones políticas limitan el igualitarismo en eses países. Estas dinámicas ayudan a explicar las estructuras fiscales son distintas en las federaciones de América Latina en comparación con las federaciones de países desarrollados. Primero, se muestra que una estructura territorial de desigualdad y la inadecuada distribución política están asociadas con un menor esfuerzo redistributivo en un contexto global y que las federaciones de América Latina tienen valores extremos de ambas variables. Segundo, utilizando una nueva base de datos sobre la distribución dentro y a través de las regiones de Argentina, Brasil y México a lo largo del tiempo, se demuestra que las condiciones que favorecen las transferencias fiscales desde el nivel nacional a los gobiernos subnacionales son consistentemente propicias, pero las condiciones son raramente favorables para que las políticas centralizadas equilibren los ingresos nacionales. Patrones d...

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The Political Consequences of Center-Led Redistribution in Brazilian Federalism: The Fall of Subnational Party Machines

Cited by 80 publications

References 26 publications

Eleições presidenciais, federalismo e política social

Eleições presidenciais, federalismo e política social

Democratic Institutions Beyond the Nation State: Measuring Institutional Dissimilarity in Federal Countries

Barriers to Egalitarianism: Distributive Tensions in Latin American Federations

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