IntroductionThe character of the Indian state has changed remarkably as a result of the economic reforms that were initiated in the early 1990s. This has been described as an "elite revolt" against the constraints of the dirigiste state by an alliance of business groups and the urban middle classes. 1 At the same time Maoist insurgents have expanded the areas in which they operate and increased the intensity of their operations, particularly in central and eastern states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa. 2 In recent years, representatives of the Indian state have made remarkable claims about the strength of the insurgents: former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the insurgency as "the single biggest internal-security challenge ever faced by our country"; 3 according to P. Chidambaram, the erstwhile Union Minister of Home Affairs, the insurgents are "active" in 223 of India's 626 districts; 4 and his ministry claimed that the insurgents "call the shots" in 40,000 square kilometers of Indian territory-an area the size of Switzerland. 5 While such statements are very effective at grabbing the attention of interested observers, they leave many unanswered questions. Lay terms such as insurgent activity and calling the shots are used as if it is clear what they mean when, in fact, it is not. Such phrases are, as Durkheim puts it, "a tangle of vague impressions, prejudices, and emotions." 6 This article combines a variety of concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, 7 insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to analyze the nature of Maoist activities. There are two sections. The first aims to move beyond the prevailing Manichean understanding of the Maoist insurgency in India, which either portrays the insurgents as either gangsters or Gandhians. We show that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise-that is, to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas-rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand the interaction between the Maoist state builders and the Indian state. It argues that the insurgents undermine and fragment the state's monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate: in some areas the Indian state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.