The Political Economy of Social Security

Casamatta, Georges; Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre

doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00212

Cited by 128 publications

(156 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…More recent models include wage differences alongside age differences. In such a framework, Casamatta et al (2000) show that the pension system is chosen by a majority made of rich and poor workers who collude against a coalition of retirees and middle class workers: this is the so-called ends against the middle outcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Leroux¹,

Racionero²

2011

European Journal of Political Economy

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Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Leroux¹,

Racionero²

2011

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Related models have been proposed, among others, by Casamatta et al (2000); Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2005); Cremer et al (2007);Hassler et al (2007) and Bossi and Gumus (2012). The basic novelty in these models is that individuals do not only differ in terms of age (workers v.s pensioners) but also with respect to their income.…”

Section: Repeated Voting With Altruism and Intra-generational Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the vein of Casamatta et al (2000), we can model the impact of intra-generational heterogeneity by using a two-generation version of the initial Browning model. Utility is given once again by an additive separable, strictly monotone, strictly concave and twice differentiable function…”

Section: Repeated Voting With Altruism and Intra-generational Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…28 For more on comparative statics and the impact of deadweight losses due to taxation see Casamatta et al (2000). Breyer and Craig (1997) For instance, Friedman (1953) maintains that assumptions are considered to be as if conjectures, hence proving them wrong is not a valid criterion for judging a theory:…”

Section: Repeated Voting With Altruism and Intra-generational Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political Preferences and the Aging of Populations

Pamp¹

2015

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“…12 Coalitions around the policy issues are possibly formed along three dimensions simultaneously: age, income, and future income prospects. When the share of L-types is relatively high, a coalition of young and middle-aged L-types will emerge to try to obtain higher transfers.…”

Section: Political Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Income Inequality, Mobility, and the Welfare State: A Political Economy Model

Bossi

Gümüş

2012

Macroecon. Dynam.

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The Political Economy of Social Security

Cited by 128 publications

References 8 publications

Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage

Political Preferences and the Aging of Populations

Income Inequality, Mobility, and the Welfare State: A Political Economy Model

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