The Political Right and Party Politics 1

Power, Timothy J.; Rodrigues-Silveira, Rodrigo

doi:10.4324/9781315543871-15

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Clearly, conservatism is a multidimensional concept (Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014b). It entails "multiple programmatic rights," involving economic, social, and authoritarian dimensions (Power and Rodrigues-Silveira 2019).…”

Section: The Content Of Conservatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections

Rennó

2020

Lat Am Polit Soc

108

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The 2018 Brazilian elections saw the rise to power of Jair Bolsonaro, yet another conservative politician who won an election in recent years. What were the ideological underpinnings of the Bolsonaro vote? Was his support based exclusively on resentment toward the Workers’ Party? This article uses a unique public opinion dataset, the 2018 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study, to explore how positions on divisive issues related to social, political, and cultural factors influenced vote choice and Bolsonarismo—affection toward Bolsonaro supporters—in the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. Results indicate that in addition to resentment against the Workers’ Party, a cultural backlash perspective, and strict views on law and order, as well as economic liberalism and rejection of social policies, were the characteristics of support for Bolsonaro.

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Section: The Content Of Conservatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections

Rennó

2020

Lat Am Polit Soc

108

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“…Unlike the PT and a few other left parties (that also seem to engage in forbearance), political parties in Brazil are nonprogrammatic, highly personalistic organizations. While many of these are considered “reputationally conservative,” their main characteristic is that they are “nonprogrammatic and opportunistic” (Power and Rodrigues‐Silveira 2018, 256). These parties are unlikely to have stable policy commitments or to share a consistent response towards the informal sector.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Courting Informal Workers: Exclusion, Forbearance, and the Left

Feierherd

2020

American J Political Sci

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Leftist governments with strong links to organized labor are expected to increase the number of people protected by job security rules. But do they? I explore whether the Left in power at the local level in Brazil cracks down on enterprises that employ noncontract, informal‐sector workers, and implements policies aimed at reducing the size of the informal sector. With a close‐election regression‐discontinuity design, I show that mayors from the Workers' Party (PT) in fact slow down enforcement and improve conditions in the informal sector, rather than encouraging a shift to formal jobs. This reflects a challenge that leftist parties face across the world: how to simultaneously improve the employment prospects and conditions of workers in precarious employment and those in full‐time jobs in the context of increased global competition, segmented labor markets and, in Latin America, truncated welfare states.

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“…Kassab's DEM, by contrast, was less distinctive. Nominally a center-right party, the DEM was particularly strong in the poorer states in the Brazilian northeast, and its major leaders were frequently associated with extensive use of patronage while in office (Montero 2010; Power and Rodrigues-Silveira 2019). Locally, the DEM was a supporter of Paulo Maluf, a popular politician and two-time mayor of the city who was later convicted of corruption charges involving illegal government contracts, being known by the phrase “ rouba, mas faz ” (“He robs, but gets things done”) (Pimentel and Penteado 2011).…”

Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment

Figueiredo

Hidalgo

Kasahara³

2022

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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When do voters punish corrupt politicians? Heterogeneous views about the importance of corruption can determine whether or not increased information enhances accountability. If partisan cleavages correlate with the importance voters place on corruption, then the consequences of information may vary by candidate, even when voters identify multiple candidates as corrupt. We provide evidence of this mechanism from a field experiment in a mayoral election in Brazil where a reputable interest group declared both candidates corrupt. We distributed fliers in the runoff mayoral election in São Paulo. Informing voters about the challenger's record reduced turnout by 1.9 percentage points and increased the opponent's vote by 2.6 percentage points. Informing voters about the incumbent's record had no effect on behavior. We attribute this divergent finding to differences in how each candidate's supporters view corruption. Using survey data and a survey experiment, we show that the challenger's supporters are more willing to punish their candidate for corruption, while the incumbent's supporters lack this inclination.

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The Political Right and Party Politics 1

Cited by 10 publications

References 29 publications

The Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections

The Bolsonaro Voter: Issue Positions and Vote Choice in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections

Courting Informal Workers: Exclusion, Forbearance, and the Left

When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from a Field and Survey Experiment

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