The Politics–Bureaucracy Interface in Developing Countries

Abstract

The political-bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest. However, research has tended to focus exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies, with little attention given to the political-administrative relationship in developing countries. However, recent evidence from reform processes in poorer nations increasingly highlights the importance of interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. This paper provides a systematic overview of the political-bureaucratic relationship in developing countries and in doing so makes two key contributions. First, it introduces a typology of political-bureaucratic relations based on four models-collaborative, collusive, intrusive, and integrated-discussing examples of each. Second, it analyses the main factors associated with different models of political-bureaucratic relations and considers how countries can move from one model of relations to another. The paper provides a much-needed entry point for scholars and policymakers to better understanding the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries.

Low‐trust bureaucracy: Understanding the Mexican bureaucratic experience

“…In the specific Latin American postcolonial tradition, formalism and hierarchy are combined with clientelism and informal discretion (Painter & Peters, , p. 23). Authoritarian legacies: The mirror image of legalism are legacies of clientelism and the politicisation of public administration, which are typical for many Latin American countries and continue to affect the functioning of the state (Cesarini & Hite, ; Méndez, ). Mexico's public administration is characterised by a “collusion” between politics and bureaucracy: There is little separation between both spheres, bureaucrats have little autonomy, and their relationship is characterised by personal or political loyalty (Dasandi & Esteve, ). Bureaucracy is politicised rather than meritocratic (Cornell & Lapuente, ), its collusive relationship with politics fosters patronage and the use of state resources for private benefits (Grindle, ), and its internal workings are characterised by arbitrariness, personal favours, and wide discretion to determine who will receive a favourable treatment.…”

“…The few studies on the administrative burdens citizens in developing countries face suggest that the bite of these burdens is even higher there (Heinrich, ; cf. Dasandi & Esteve, ). This article presents an analysis of the nature of administrative burdens in Mexico—which can serve as a point of reference for studies in similar countries.…”

Repensando o Estado brasileiro: em busca de um modelo sustentável

“…Assim, uma coordenação política torna-se necessária para que as burocracias possam interagir e cooperar. Porém, a literatura sobre a interface entre política e burocracia é escassa (Dasandi;Esteve, 2017), sendo esta uma área relevante principalmente quando aparecem problemas mais complexos, como mudanças climáticas, que não são previstos na constituição, deixando as interações acontecerem de forma voluntária e informal.…”

The Political Process of Bureaucratic Reform: Wonosobo Regional Government Experience from 2011-2015

“…Regarding the process of bureaucratic reform, empirical experiences of several countries reveal that bureaucratic reform is mainly influenced by the political interplay of bureaucrats and politicians (Ricks, 2018;Dasandi & Esteve, 2017;Alexander, Lewis & Considine, 2011) and that regional governments are generally conservative in carrying out downsizing policies due to financial, legal, and political challenges (Berenschot, 2018;Liou & Feldheim, 2018). However, study on the political process of bureaucratic reform focusing on the utilization of influence tactics by pro-reform bureaucrats in carrying out extreme bureaucratic downsizing is scarce.…”