The Politics of Blame Avoidance: Defensive Tactics in a Dutch Crime-Fighting Fiasco

Framing the Global Economic downturn : Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions

“…In all, this pattern corresponds closely with the findings of other studies of blame management-namely, a pattern of 'staged retreat': the potential blamee tries to keep the discussion about blame as far away as possible from themselves, but as the pressure on them increases (because new facts become known, more people have become angry or credible other voices are starting to question their involvement, competence or intent), they retreat to less ideal but still potentially workable forms of blame avoidance (Bovens et al 1999;Brändström and Kuipers 2003;Hood et al 2007). It is important to note that none of the policymakers engaged in proactive acceptance of responsibility, forfeiting the option of ending up in the relatively benign 'blame minimisation' game type, in which early and forthright public acknowledgment of responsibility gets the blamee 'off the hook' in the media and parliamentary arenas (see Table 2.1; for empirical illustration, see Brändström et al 2008).…”

Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

“…There is thus no trade-off like in the anticipatory blame game. During reactive blame games, blamed actors mainly have to rely on different types of blame management strategies (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström et al, 2008). Agency and policy strategies are less useful during reactive blame games, since they usually cannot be put in place on an ad hoc basis, or at least lack credibility if implemented swiftly.…”

“…Table 1 provides an overview of the literature on BAB along the two dimensions outlined above. (Pierson, 1994(Pierson, , 1996 BAB as a means of pursuing risky reforms (Vis, 2016) Arms-length institutional bodies that displace blame (Fiorina, 1982;Horn, 1995) Indexing provisions that limit budgetary discretion (Weaver, 1988) Opposition of policies that impose large and direct costs (Arnold, 1990) Blame-decreasing organizational responses to demands for transparency (Hood and Rothstein, 2001) Responsibility-blurring governance vacuums in multi-level systems (Bache et al, 2015) Reactive BAB Justification for retrenchment and its effects (Mortensen, 2012;Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 2016) Blame-deflecting effects of political accounts (McGraw, 1991) Cabinet officials as 'lightning rods' (Ellis, 1994) Blame management after crisis situations (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström and Kuipers, 2003;Brändström et al, 2008;Hood et al, 2009;Boin et al, 2010;Moynihan, 2012;Brändström, 2015) Commissions of inquiry for blame avoidance reasons (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) Blame attribution effects of public sector reforms (Mortensen, 2013b) Conceptualizing BAB…”

“…Research has shown that there are many situations in which officeholders try to shield themselves from blame and that these are not limited to instances of retrenchment. BAB is studied in the policy process, in administrations and networks, after crises and failures as well as during the normal course of events (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström and Kuipers, 2003;Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015;Hood, 2007;Boin et al, 2009;Hood et al, 2009;Hood, 2011;Moynihan, 2012;Mortensen, 2013b).…”

Governance of Ethiopia Public Universities in Southern Region: Professional & Administrative Accountability Perspective

“…It increasingly used in political discourse and policy documents because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. However, its evocative powers make it also a very elusive concept (Bovens, 2003). In contemporary political discourse, 'accountability' holds strong promises of fair and equitable governance; it is the authorities themselves who being held accountable by their citizens, a hallmark of modern democratic governance (Dubnick, 2002).…”