2019
DOI: 10.3751/73.2.15
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The Politics of Development and Security in Iran's Border Provinces

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Cited by 4 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The distribution may be interpreted in such a way that governments purposefully invest into specific, mostly poor and underdeveloped provinces, while other provinces receive the leftover. These findings partly contradict the existing research (Lob, Habibi 2019), that shows that socioeconomic and developmental disparities between low-income and high-income provinces remain high.…”
Section: Tutelary Regime and Distributive Politics In Irancontrasting
confidence: 94%
“…The distribution may be interpreted in such a way that governments purposefully invest into specific, mostly poor and underdeveloped provinces, while other provinces receive the leftover. These findings partly contradict the existing research (Lob, Habibi 2019), that shows that socioeconomic and developmental disparities between low-income and high-income provinces remain high.…”
Section: Tutelary Regime and Distributive Politics In Irancontrasting
confidence: 94%
“…Such challenges and obstacles were certainly not exclusive to Kurdistan, even if their intensity was heightened by the dynamics of structural violence and systemic discrimination which have long characterised Kurdistan’s relationship to the centre. An emergent ‘development-security nexus’ has been unable to overturn consistent patterns of underdevelopment that have continued to be reflected in significant disparities in the levels of literacy, poverty rates, and life-expectancy found in Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan (Elling, 2013: 56; Lob and Habibi, 2019: 273). Both of these provinces have consistently ranked among the lowest of Iran’s provinces in per capita income as well as on the Human Development Index (Lob and Habibi, 2019: 271).…”
Section: Overdetermination Contradiction and Conjunctural Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An emergent ‘development-security nexus’ has been unable to overturn consistent patterns of underdevelopment that have continued to be reflected in significant disparities in the levels of literacy, poverty rates, and life-expectancy found in Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan (Elling, 2013: 56; Lob and Habibi, 2019: 273). Both of these provinces have consistently ranked among the lowest of Iran’s provinces in per capita income as well as on the Human Development Index (Lob and Habibi, 2019: 271). Peaceful protest and the expression of grievances against such oppressive and unequal conditions is disciplined, policed, and when deemed necessary, brutally repressed by the heavy and disproportionate concentration of security officials and military personnel in Kurdistan, as many as 200,000, according to one estimate (Moradi et al, 2022: 11).…”
Section: Overdetermination Contradiction and Conjunctural Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These opponents included center-left parties and politicians, Shāh loyalists and royalists, communists and Marxists, Sunni and ethnic separatists, traditional elites and other counterrevolutionaries, and Iraqi forces and their collaborators. Khumaynī and the IRP feared provincial and rural opponents comprised of communists, Marxists, and leftists, including the Tūdih (Masses) Party, the People's Guerilla Warriors (Chirīkhā-i Fidāyī-i 15 Former CJ member, interview with the author, Tehran, March 9, 2011; "Khāṭirātī-i"; ʿAbbās Ākhūndī, "Jahād-i Sāzandigī, āyīnih-i inqilāb [CJ, A Looking Glass into the Revolution]," Khabar Online, June 20, 2013, https://www.khaba ronli ne.ir/detai l/29974 3/weblo g/akhondi; and E. Lob,Iran's Reconstruction,22,58,[60][61]63. 16 Nātiq-Nūrī, Khāṭirāt-i, 189-90; Ākhūndī, "Khāṭirātī-i"; E. Lob, Iran's Reconstruction, 59.…”
Section: A Brief History Of Cj: From Inception To Bureaucratization (...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…59 As a consequence, and despite the activities of CJ and other institutions, the pronounced developmental and socioeconomic disparities, along with the systematic discrimination and exclusion, that had existed under the Shāh between the Persianmajority central provinces and the ethnic-minority peripheral ones persisted and worsened, leading to rising discontent, conflict, and instability. 60 The discourse, interpretation, and practice of Khumaynī and CJ members surrounding the organization were innovative in that jihād was equated with material and faith-based development. At the same time, and within the specific historical context of the Iranian revolution, this discourse, interpretation, and practice of jihād conformed to a non-essentialist or deterministic and ever evolving Islamic tradition in four ways.…”
Section: A Brief History Of Cj: From Inception To Bureaucratization (...mentioning
confidence: 99%