The politics of establishing catchment management agencies in South Africa: the case of the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency

Abstract

ABSTRACT. We reflect on the politics of establishing catchment management agencies in South Africa with a specific focus on the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency (BOCMA), which was recently replaced by the Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management Agency (BGCMA). We do so by applying the framework of adaptive comanagement and its institutional prescriptions: collaboration, experimentation, and a bioregional approach. We start by introducing the history of this catchment management agency (CMA) and then describe the establishment of CMAs in South Africa in general and that of BOCMA in particular. We follow the framework for rule types and types of river basin organizations set out by the editors of this special feature with reference to adaptive comanagement where applicable. We then discuss the politics and strategies involved in the introduction of the CMA concept to the National Water Act and the latest developments around these institutions in South Africa. This is followed by reflections on what can be surmised about BOCMA's democratic functioning and performance to date. We conclude by reflecting on the future of operations of the new BGCMA and CMAs in South Africa in general. While our research shows that BOCMA's establishment process has featured several elements of adaptive comanagement and its institutional prescriptions, it remains to be seen to what extent it is possible to continue implementing this concept when further developing and operationalizing the BGCMA and the country's other CMAs.

The institutional design, politics, and effects of a bioregional approach: observations and lessons from 11 case studies of river basin organizations

“…In the South African case study, this power is reflected in the state's authority to determine the composition of the catchment management board. Meissner et al (2016) argue that this state power is probably required to manage the challenge of power differences between vested economic interests and marginalized parties.…”

“…The reasons for this difficulty are the still powerful hierarchical governmental institutions in place, which hinder cross-sector exchange of information, and the failure to take account of traditional water management practices such as the Abandaz system in Afghanistan. The BreedeOverberg Catchment management agency, however, performs relatively well (Meissner et al 2016). …”

“…Examples of these are the democratic transition of South Africa (Meissner et al 2016), the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Warner and Thomas 2014), the decentralization process after peaceful democratic revolution in Mongolia (Dombrowsky et al 2014), and the transitioning process after independence in the Ukraine (Hagemann and Leidel 2014).…”

“…Other relevant factors, which played a role in the delineation made by the founders, were the transport costs to attend meetings, the number of council seats, and the anticipated income through fee collection (Warner and Thomas 2014). In the South African case study (Meissner et al 2016), next to hydrological criteria, the potential for a catchment management agency to achieve financial viability in the medium to long term already was and has recently become an even more important criterion for delineating the geographical boundaries of the RBOs.…”

“…Here, we use this typology to characterize RBOs in 11 river basins across the globe. We include in-depth studies of four of these RBOs in this special feature: the Westcountry Rivers Trust in the UK (Cook et al 2016), the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency in South Africa (Meissner et al 2016), the Mackenzie River Basin Board in Canada (Morris and de Loë 2016), and the Murray-Daring Basin Authority in Australia (Ross and Connell 2016). Information on the other RBOs can be found in Huitema and Meijerink (2014).…”