The Politics of Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and Accountability

Ardanaz, Mart́ın; Leiras, Marcelo; Tommasi, Mariano

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.004

Cited by 68 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…In sum, as argued by Ardanaz et al. (), the importance of the provinces in national politics and the dominance of governors in national politics, are factors that reinforce each other. In order to be successful in this two‐level game, it is important for governors to be good at the game of extracting resources from the center.…”

Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 77%

“…Gervasoni (2010) uses rentier theories of the state to explain the weaknesses of democracy in the Argentine provinces as a consequence of the fact that governors finance most public spending from resources not obtained from direct taxes on the province's citizenry. 21 In sum, as argued by Ardanaz et al (2010), the importance of the provinces in national politics and the dominance of governors in national politics, are factors that reinforce each other. In order to be successful in this two-level game, it is important for governors to be good at the game of extracting resources from the center.…”

Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Provincial politicians, then, enjoy a large share of the political benefit of spending, yet pay only a small fraction of the political cost of taxation. 16 The description provided in this section draws from Jones et al (2000), Tommasi (2006), Spiller and Tommasi (2007), Benton (2008), and Ardanaz et al (2010).…”

Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(), Spiller and Tommasi (, ), Eaton (), Jones and Hwang (), Levitsky and Murillo (), Remmer (), Benton (), and Ardanaz et al. ().…”

unclassified

“…18See, for instance, DeLuca et al (2002),Jones et al (2002),Tommasi (2003, 2007),Eaton (2005),Jones and Hwang (2005),Levitsky and Murillo (2005),Remmer (2007),Benton (2008), andArdanaz et al (2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems

Jones

Meloni

Tommasi

2012

Economics & Politics

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Most empirical evidence indicates voters penalize deficits and spending growth. Contrary to this dominant finding, a few recent studies conclude that voters reward public spending. We reconcile these conflicting findings, positing that the structure of fiscal federalism in countries like Argentina causes voters to reward fiscal expansion because they perceive that this extra spending at the margin is not financed by them, but rather by the nation at large. We provide evidence and microfoundations for the electoral connection implicit in this argument: voters reward public spending when they can pass the cost on to someone else (e.g., as in Argentina), and punish it otherwise (e.g., as in the United States).

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Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 77%

Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: The Fiscal and Political Context Undergirding Argentine Fedementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(), Spiller and Tommasi (, ), Eaton (), Jones and Hwang (), Levitsky and Murillo (), Remmer (), Benton (), and Ardanaz et al. ().…”

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voters as Fiscal Liberals: Incentives and Accountability in Federal Systems

Jones

Meloni

Tommasi

2012

Economics & Politics

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The political economy of fiscal transfers: The case of Ethiopia

Yimenu

2024

Public Admin & Development

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This article examines the political economy of fiscal transfers in Ethiopia. Utilising an original data set spanning 1995–2020, as well as interviews and document analyses, the article illustrates how different factors interact to shape the distribution of grants. Statistical analysis indicates that population size is critical in determining regional grant shares. However, the analyses reveal a pattern of ethno‐regional favouritism in grant distributions during the early stages of Ethiopian federalism. During that period, opaque and centralised decision‐making processes, coupled with the dominant influence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the federal government, resulted in grant distribution deviating from principles of fiscal equity. Over time, this evolved into more fluid forms of negotiation influenced by intra‐party competition, dynamics of bargaining between the central and regional authorities, and regional assertiveness, collectively shaping the allocation of grants alongside the grant formula. The analysis highlights how economically and politically marginalised regions are disadvantaged, especially when their population is small. The absence of an independent grant agency means that political considerations continue to affect seemingly formula‐driven allocations. The Ethiopian case underscores how intra‐party bargaining and alignment along ethnic and regional lines undermine the effectiveness of formula‐based grant allocations in the absence of an independent and empowered grant agency.

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