1997
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00100
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The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on Third World Development

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Cited by 57 publications
(31 citation statements)
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“…The problem with the Chabal and Daloz's analysis, for example, is that what they refer to as a specifically African problem is actually a general characteristic of all developing countries undergoing processes of primitive accumulation and associated political corruption (Hutchcroft, 1997;Khan, 2007). The institutionalisation of order (stable property rights, entrenched democracy, low corruption, accountability of leaders) requires a significant level of development in order to be effectively implemented (Khan, 2007).…”
Section: Problems With 'Functionalist' and 'New Wars' Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The problem with the Chabal and Daloz's analysis, for example, is that what they refer to as a specifically African problem is actually a general characteristic of all developing countries undergoing processes of primitive accumulation and associated political corruption (Hutchcroft, 1997;Khan, 2007). The institutionalisation of order (stable property rights, entrenched democracy, low corruption, accountability of leaders) requires a significant level of development in order to be effectively implemented (Khan, 2007).…”
Section: Problems With 'Functionalist' and 'New Wars' Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What matters are the outcomes, and those are varied (Hutchcroft 1997). It is probably easier to see the harm caused by clientelistic politics and patrimonial administration than it is to observe their positive features, but the fact remains that no governance system could operate effectively without some degree of institutional dualism, some balance among "bad" informal practices and "good" formal ones.…”
Section: Institutional Dualism: What Costs? What Benefits?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rigging elections and using public money to finance an incumbent's campaign are examples of corruption, but do not involve reciprocity between two parties. Also, corruption, being "the violation of norms based on a distinction between what is public and what is private" (Hutchcroft 1997), clearly involves public office or public resources, which is not always the case for exchange-based political relationships. Finally, several seminal works on corruption highlight the importance of attitudes in identifying what is or is not corrupt.…”
Section: Relationship Levelmentioning
confidence: 99%