The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States

Lowery, David; Gray, Virginia

doi:10.2307/2111755

Cited by 165 publications

(212 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…This result lends support to the hypothesis that in accordance with the competitive exclusion principle, gay and lesbian groups avoid direct competition by partitioning space (members) through their adaptation to different issue niches. The finding is consistent with the implications of the population ecology theory suggested by Lowery and Gray (1995) and the findings of Gray and Lowery's (1996) test of niche theory.…”

supporting

confidence: 88%

“…How do interest groups resolve this conflict between selfpreservation and the achievement of a collective good? Lowery and Gray (1995) provide at least part of the answer in their analysis of interest groups at the aggregate level. They draw on biological concepts from population ecology theory to explain the number of groups within specific issue areas, but they do not use the theory to explain how or why membership levels in a group might vary across political jurisdictions.…”

Section: Surviving As An Organized Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The energy interest groups need to survive comes largely from the actual or potential benefits available to the group from government (Lowery and Gray 1995). To account for energy, therefore, we must measure government action or potential action on gay and lesbian issues.…”

Section: Dependent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

Haider‐Markel¹

1997

The Journal of Politics

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SURVIVING AS AN ORGANIZED INTERESTIn order to survive, an organization must effectively exploit the resources in its environment. Because many organizations are dependent on the same resources as other, similar, organizations, they must find a way to share resources or eliminate other organizations through competition. In the case of interest groups working toward the same goal or collective good, however, competition seems illogical. How do interest groups resolve this conflict between selfpreservation and the achievement of a collective good? Lowery and Gray (1995) provide at least part of the answer in their analysis of interest groups at the aggregate level. They draw on biological concepts from population ecology theory to explain the number of groups within specific issue areas, but they do not use the theory to explain how or why membership levels in a group might vary across political jurisdictions. Because population ecology theory outlines the nature of an ecosystem where groups within an issue area must struggle for resources and members to survive, the purpose here is to test the implications of the theory for the membership levels of interest groups within an issue area. I review population ecology theory and other literature addressing

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supporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Surviving As An Organized Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

Haider‐Markel¹

1997

The Journal of Politics

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“…Lowery and Gray, 1995;Nownes, 2004Nownes, , 2010Stretesky, Huss, and Lynch, 2012), electoral systems (Lowery et al, 2010), and political parties (Lowery et al, 2013). At present, it remains to be applied to social cleavages.…”

Section: The Organizational Ecology Of Ethnic Cleavagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The organizational ecology of ethnic cleavages: The nonlinear effects of ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation

Raymond

2015

Electoral Studies

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This is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Electoral Studies. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Electoral Studies, [VOL 37, March 2015] doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. AbstractThe conventional wisdom regarding party system fragmentation assumes that the effects of electoral systems and social cleavages are linear. However, recent work applying organizational ecology theories to the study of party systems has challenged the degree to which electoral system effects are linear. This paper applies such concepts to the study of social cleavages. Drawing from theories of organizational ecology and the experience of many ethnically diverse African party systems, I argue that the effects of ethnic diversity are nonlinear, with party system fragmentation increasing until reaching moderate levels of diversity before declining as diversity reaches extreme values. Examining this argument cross-nationally, the results show that accounting for nonlinearity in ethnic diversity effects significantly improves model fit.1

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“…On this view, group formation patterns can be explained by where patrons choose to put their money, or what Nownes & Neeley (1996) refer to as the importance of an entrepreneur, one who is "willing to raise and/or provide start up resources" for group formation (136). Lowery and Gray (1995;1997;2007) developed an alternative approach drawing from the biological study of ecosystems that posits that interest groups will be more numerous and diverse when there is a large amount of political energy to sustain a number of groups. Political energy is a function of two variables, party competition -which influences the stakes of elections -and the salience of interests relevant to the interest groups -which makes policy changes on relevant issues more likely.…”

Section: Theories Of Interest Group Mobilizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Special Interests AfterCitizens United: Access, Replacement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change

Issacharoff

Peterman

2013

Annu. Rev. Law. Soc. Sci.

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The legal literature on campaign finance law and the political science literature on how and why interest groups mobilize use different methodologies to get at overlapping issues. This review integrates some of these insights to better understand the relationship between interest group participation in elections and changes in campaign finance law. The post–Citizens United world of law created regulatory vacuums that only certain groups tried to take advantage of. For example, little corporate money found its way into Super PACs or groups engaging in independent electoral advocacy. We argue that ascertaining interest groups' objectives of either using contributions to candidates to obtain access, on one hand, or using independent expenditures to install friendly candidates in office, on the other, is key to understanding how interest groups respond to legal developments. We also argue that although interest group participation in elections increased in 2012, the party-centric federal election system was largely resilient to increased interest group mobilizations, highlighting the difficulties with the replacement strategy.

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The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States

Cited by 165 publications

References 41 publications

Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

Interest Group Survival: Shared Interests Versus Competition for Resources

The organizational ecology of ethnic cleavages: The nonlinear effects of ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation

Special Interests AfterCitizens United: Access, Replacement, and Interest Group Response to Legal Change

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