The Populist phenomena and the reasons for their success in Hungary

Abstract

After the parliamentary elections in 2014, the weakened legitimacy of the Hungarian government could be re-established through activism in migration issues. Fidesz-KDNP that won elections twice already highlighted migration as the main theme of governance from 2014 to 2018, suppressing every other topic on the political agenda. The position that was established for purposes of the Hungarian domestic situation and politics initially faced intense rejections all over Europe, but then garnered some supporters as well, mostly in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, and to a smaller extent among the right-wing and populist parties of Western Europe. The anti-refugee and populist approach caused significant success in the communication field to the subscribing parties and governments, and also legitimised Hungarian government’s efforts that could mean it met the majority of the Hungarian society’s expectations. The most essential question is that how can political science reshape its terms and thoughts on populism to understand this phenomenon better, moreover what are the reasons of populism and why is the populist propaganda such successful in Hungary and Eastern Europe.

On the Way to Limited Competitiveness: Political Consequences of the 2011 Electoral Reform in Hungary

“…On the other hand, the outcomes of the 2010 elections proved that Hungarian politics had overcome its ‘long term ‘entrenched’ twofold division’ (Pogátsa, 2013). The opposition FIDESZ won a two‐thirds majority (67.88%) of seats in the parliament with 52.73% of the vote (in the list PR tier), the MSZP lost (after a series of corruption scandals and unpopular policy measures) its system status as the second main pole of the Hungarian party system (with 15.28% of the seats and 19.3% of the vote), and two new parties – the extreme right‐wing Jobbik and the green‐liberal Politics Can Be Different (LMP) – reached the 5% threshold, thus obtaining 12.18% and 4.15% of the seats, respectively (Fábián, 2010; Bánkuti et al, 2012; Glied, 2020).…”

Good and Bad migrants in Hungary. The populist story and the reality in Hungarian migration policy

“…The right-wing government noticed very quickly that the populist anti-migration communicationthat contained diverse elements to convince Hungarian voters -was overwhelmingly successful not only in Hungary but in the recently democratised Central European states and the countries of the Balkans, awaiting the accession to the European Union, therefore, it could be used to achieve domestic political goals (Szalai & Gőbl, 2015;Juhász et. al., 2015;Glied, 2020).…”

The Orbán regime as the ‘perfect autocracy’: The emergence of the ‘zombie democracy’ in Hungary

“…On the Hungarian developments see for instanceBuzogány and Varga (2019), CIVICO Europa (2020),Coakley (2021), CoE (2020b,Csehi (2019Csehi ( , 2021,Csehi and Zgut (2020),Glied (2020) andScheiring (2020). There are many joint analyses about Hungary and Poland, seeCianetti et al (2018),Csehi and Zgut (2020),Cianetti et al (2018),Theuns (2020) andVarga and Buzogány (2020).5 The unfair, manipulated elections have been described byScheppele (2014 and2015), see also the very critical OSCE (2014) andCouncil of Europe (CoE, 2020a, b and 2021a, b) Reports.…”