No abstract

The co-existence between Hungarians and Islam has been considered balanced, until the spring of 2015 when a wave of migrants appeared in Europe. “Opening to the East”, the foreign policy announced by the government in 2011 heralded a new chapter of cooperation with Arabic/Muslim countries, predominantly due to economic considerations. The migrant crisis turned government communication, as well as the stance of Jobbik, the largest opposition party, upside down. This paper discusses the unique phenomenon of what role the political debate about Islam and the construction of the temporary border barrier protecting the Hungarian national borders played in the competitive communication of the national-radical, pro-Muslim opposition Jobbik party (achieving a lead in the polls) and the centre-right governing parties Fidesz-kdnp which typically emphasise their Christian character.

After the parliamentary elections in 2014, the weakened legitimacy of the Hungarian government could be re-established through activism in migration issues. Fidesz-KDNP that won elections twice already highlighted migration as the main theme of governance from 2014 to 2018, suppressing every other topic on the political agenda. The position that was established for purposes of the Hungarian domestic situation and politics initially faced intense rejections all over Europe, but then garnered some supporters as well, mostly in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, and to a smaller extent among the right-wing and populist parties of Western Europe. The anti-refugee and populist approach caused significant success in the communication field to the subscribing parties and governments, and also legitimised Hungarian government’s efforts that could mean it met the majority of the Hungarian society’s expectations. The most essential question is that how can political science reshape its terms and thoughts on populism to understand this phenomenon better, moreover what are the reasons of populism and why is the populist propaganda such successful in Hungary and Eastern Europe.

This article analyses the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election manifestos of populist parties in V4 countries as a contribution to the contemporary discussion on political populism. The aim of the study is to analyze the election campaign programs which populist parties operating in individual V4 countries presented for EP elections in 2019, using a qualitative content analysis of the official election programs of relevant populist parties and other sources of their communication. It tries to identify topics that have been framed as a problem or risk by Central European populists and how these topics have been interpreted in their programs. The so-called “immigration crisis” and the contemporary state of the European Union are seen as the most problematic topics by a majority of the populists. On the other hand, the majority of these parties do not want some Central European version of Brexit. Their rhetorical goal is rather the reform the Union.

This paper examines developments in Poland following the 2015 elections and in Hungary since 2010, which included the gradual destruction of democratic institutions, challenges to the rule of law, as well as to the system of checks and balances. The authors consider the Ziblatt–Levitsky model (2018) as a meaningful framework for the analysis of the way in which the power structure was reshaped and have based their research on the classification set out in this model. Our objective is to present the political changes that took place in the two Central-Eastern-European countries during the last decade that resulted in the process under Article 7 being used for the first time in the history of the EU. The paper conclusion is that the path of de-democratization of Hungary and Poland is seen from the perspective of the EU and Council of Europe, as similar one. In actions taken toward both countries, the EU concerns mostly the principle of the rule of law.