2003
DOI: 10.1023/a:1026247421383
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The Practice of Finitism: Epsilon Calculus and Consistency Proofs in Hilbert's Program

Abstract: Abstract. After a brief flirtation with logicism in 1917-1920, David Hilbert proposed his own program in the foundations of mathematics in 1920 and developed it, in concert with collaborators such as Paul Bernays and Wilhelm Ackermann, throughout the 1920s. The two technical pillars of the project were the development of axiomatic systems for ever stronger and more comprehensive areas of mathematics and finitistic proofs of consistency of these systems. Early advances in these areas were made by Hilbert (and B… Show more

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Cited by 84 publications
(41 citation statements)
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“…The ε-calculus was originally developed in the context of Hilbert's program of consistency proofs. Early work in proof theory (before Gentzen) concentrated on the ε-calculus and the ε-substitution method and was carried out by Ackermann [1,2] (see also [19]), von Neumann [24], and Bernays [14] (see also [25,26]). The ε-calculus is of independent and lasting interest, however, and a study from a computational and proof-theoretic point of view is particularly worthwhile.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ε-calculus was originally developed in the context of Hilbert's program of consistency proofs. Early work in proof theory (before Gentzen) concentrated on the ε-calculus and the ε-substitution method and was carried out by Ackermann [1,2] (see also [19]), von Neumann [24], and Bernays [14] (see also [25,26]). The ε-calculus is of independent and lasting interest, however, and a study from a computational and proof-theoretic point of view is particularly worthwhile.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…42 strikingly similar to Weyl's viewpoint in Weyl [79]. On his side, Zach [86] establishes (p. 220) that the general schema of primitive recursion was already mentioned in Hilbert's unpublished course of 1921-1923. Moreover, he argues that Hilbert's outlook was markedly different from Skolem's [55] (suggesting that there was no influence either way).…”
Section: Hilbert's Defense Of Formalismmentioning
confidence: 64%
“…I would like only to point out some philosophical modifications it involved. 29 Hilbert supported indeed 28 See in particular the recent paper by R. Zach [86] 30 and to play fully the formula game in a constructive way. a) Hilbert was urged by Brouwer's and Weyl's objections to make precise the concept of formal system through a kind of material implementation.…”
Section: Hilbert's Defense Of Formalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(We will discuss the connection between P RA and the system A presently.) Literally, Gödel is mistaken about this: As Richard Zach has noted [Zach, 2003], Hilbert had approved as finitist Ackermann's use of induction up to ω ω ω in his dissertation [Ackermann, 1924]. In fact, though, the only instance of transfinite induction for which Ackermann gave any justification in his paper was induction up to ω 2 and his argument was essentially just the reduction of this to primitive recursion with substitution in the parameters (which of course reduces to primitive recursion).…”
Section: Gödel Expressed the View That Finitism Is Open-ended From Almentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, although the issue has been debated on the battlefield of §7 of Grundlagen der Mathematik, Volume 1 [Hilbert and Bernays, 1934] (see [Zach, 1998], [Tait, 2002] and [Tait, 2005b, Appendix]), the question of whether Bernays, in the period 1922 until 1931, when the quest for consistency proofs was framed in terms of finitism and before the need to extend that framework became apparent, regarded reducibility to P RA as the essential mark of finitist definition and proof is not, in my opinion, definitively resolved. On the other hand, the absence of a clear statement of that criterion could lead one to the presumption that they did not accept it.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%