The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay

Testa, Italo; Caruana, Fausto

doi:10.1017/9781108682312.001

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Zowel het enactivisme als de ecologische psychologie hebben hun conceptuele grondslagen in het Amerikaans pragmatisme en de fenomenologie. Alhoewel de eerste enactivisten zich historisch voornamelijk aan het werk van Merleau-Ponty verbonden, is er recentelijk sprake van een pragmatistische wending binnen het enactivisme waarmee het begrip 'gewoonte' centraal komt te staan (Testa en Caruana 2021). Alhoewel ik begin met de invloed van Merleau-Ponty, zal ik in dit artikel vooral de invloed van het pragmatisme benadrukken, wetend dat dit niet karakteriserend is voor de belichaamde visie op cognitie als geheel.…”

Section: Pragmatisme En Fenomenologie Als Wieg Voor Het Belichaamde D...unclassified

Denken uit gewoonten: een belichaamd perspectief

Heijmeskamp

2022

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte

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Thinking out of habit: an embodied perspectiveIn the second half of the twentieth century, habit had received little attention in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of cognition. This despite the extensive theoretical attention habit received in phenomenology and pragmatism. This is because due to influence of behaviorism and the cognitivist revolution, habit was reduced to mechanical stimulus-response reaction that is learned through drill and repetition, and therefore habit cannot be considered intelligent. In this article I argue that a richer and more accurate notion of habit is possible through an embodied vision of cognition, namely enactivism and ecological psychology. This means that we can consider habit as intelligent without equating habit with reflective thought. Such a notion is possible because both enactivism and ecological psychology have their conceptual roots in pragmatism and phenomenology. Secondly, an embodied vison of cognition can describe how our habits are formed from sensorimotor contingencies and are self-organizing patterns of behavior in interaction with an environment. This can be described through the metaphor of 'laying down a path', whereby taking a shortcut across a f ield of grass a path is formed, which enables walking across the f ield of grass. Laying down a path is more than a metaphor, but also an example of the sociomaterial dimension of habit. Habits are always formed in an interaction between an organism and an environment that is, in our case both material and social.

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Section: Pragmatisme En Fenomenologie Als Wieg Voor Het Belichaamde D...unclassified

Denken uit gewoonten: een belichaamd perspectief

Heijmeskamp

2022

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte

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“…Neither will I deal with the concept of habit in all its variety as it shows up across various fields in the social and behavioral sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology, neuroscience). Recent comprehensive overviews of the use of the habit concept across disciplines have been provided by Barandiaran and Di Paolo (2014) and Testa and Caruana (2020). Instead, I concentrate on developing the analytic conception of habit as a resource for explaining action in social theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Habit and the explanation of action

Ližardo

2021

J Theory Soc Behav

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In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific "historical" way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit-based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention-based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members.

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The ‘Spaghettification’ of Performativity Across Cultural Boundaries: The Trans-culturality/Trans-Spatiality of Digital Communication As an Event Horizon for Speech Acts

Ricca

2022

Int J Semiot Law

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The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay

Cited by 4 publications

References 93 publications

Denken uit gewoonten: een belichaamd perspectief

Denken uit gewoonten: een belichaamd perspectief

Habit and the explanation of action

The ‘Spaghettification’ of Performativity Across Cultural Boundaries: The Trans-culturality/Trans-Spatiality of Digital Communication As an Event Horizon for Speech Acts

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