The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions

We study the efficiency of first-/second-price sequential multiunit auctions with two buyers and complete information. Extending the primal-dual framework for obtaining efficiency bounds to this sequential setting, we obtain tight price of anarchy bounds. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly 1/ T for auctions with T items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by 1 − 1/ e ≃ 0.632. This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.

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The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

Ahunbay

Vetta

2023

ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

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The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions

Cited by 1 publication

References 15 publications

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions

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