The prime minister's constitution: Cabinet rulebooks in Westminster democracies

Abstract

The transformation of governance in Westminster democracies is well documented. However, one aspect of their change that has not received much attention is the creation and publication of cabinet rulebooks. The few studies of cabinet rulebooks have focused on their potential constitutional implications, leaving unclear how their emergence fits within the broader development of Westminster governance. We address this gap in the literature by examining cabinet rulebooks in five Westminster democracies: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We analyze their features and emergence, and then set out a framework to analyze their potential effects on cabinet dynamics. We find that the appearance of cabinet rulebooks can be tied to several forces of change in Westminster systems, but most especially the growth of government. Furthermore, we find that these rulebooks project an account of prime ministerial power that is favorable to the prime minister.

Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning Co-Responsibility in Cabinet Decisions

“…Ministers are often required to consult with other ministers who have an interest in the decision before introducing it to the entire cabinet. They need to get the approval of the prime minister to place the decision on the cabinet's agenda and they need to gain the required majority in the cabinet to pass the decision (Barry et al, 2022).…”

“…This, however, is not unusual. In many other parliamentary democracies, the threshold of what is being brought to the cabinet and what is left to the department is contingent on the type of government and its composition (Barry et al, 2022;Nousiainen, 1993).…”

The Comparative Politics of Cabinet Reshuffles

“…In many coalition governments, a resignation of a minister from a coalition party not controlling the office of head of government would be considered at least as much as a blow to his or her party leader as to the head of government, who usually has little to no discretion when it comes to replacing a minister from a coalition party. 8 More generally, there is an established tradition of considering cabinets as the institutional centrepiece of these systems (see Barry et al 2022;Curtin et al 2022;Helms 2020a;Weller 2003Weller , 2015. At the same time, there are many dynamics concerning the changing composition of the cabinetfrom hiring and firing to rehiring ministers, and redefining their responsibilitiesthat do not pass as reshuffles if they do not take place within the lifetime of a given cabinet.…”