This article defends luck egalitarianism as an interpretation of the egalitarian ideal against two major criticisms levelled against it by Elizabeth Anderson -that it is trapped in the distributive paradigm, and that it treats the victims of bad option luck too harshly to be considered an egalitarian theory. Against the first criticism, I argue that luck egalitarianism will condemn non-material inequalities and injustices if an appropriate conception of wellbeing is adopted. I demonstrate this by showing how the approach is sensitive to the five faces of oppression developed by Iris Young. Although the second criticism is more troubling, it does not defeat luck egalitarianism, either. I will show that few of the inequalities that arise in the real world result from option luck. Further, if cases do occur, rather than abandoning the theory, the best response is to combine luck egalitarianism with another egalitarian principle that will ensure that the basic needs of all citizens are satisfied. The paper concludes by defending the appeal of the distinction between option luck and brute luck, in light of the preceding discussion.

In this paper, I analyze two major problems with brute luck egalitarianism. The first problem is that some instances of option luck inequality are inconsistent with the underlying motivation of the luck egalitarian project, and the second problem is that brute luck egalitarianism, at least on Dworkin's formulation, is insufficiently sensitive to the way background inequalities shape individual choices. Whilst G.A Cohen's more nuanced version of brute luck egalitarianism overcomes the second problem by focusing on the genuineness of choices, it does not avoid the first problem of noncompensable option luck. I outline a revised theory of luck egalitarianism that overcomes both problems by focusing on the extent to which individuals have genuinely chosen the level of well-being they enjoy, rejecting the distinction between noncompensable option luck and compensable brute luck. I conclude by outlining the radical redistributive implications of this theory, which run counter to the direction of recent left-liberal policy ''modernization.''

The transformation of governance in Westminster democracies is well documented. However, one aspect of their change that has not received much attention is the creation and publication of cabinet rulebooks. The few studies of cabinet rulebooks have focused on their potential constitutional implications, leaving unclear how their emergence fits within the broader development of Westminster governance. We address this gap in the literature by examining cabinet rulebooks in five Westminster democracies: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We analyze their features and emergence, and then set out a framework to analyze their potential effects on cabinet dynamics. We find that the appearance of cabinet rulebooks can be tied to several forces of change in Westminster systems, but most especially the growth of government. Furthermore, we find that these rulebooks project an account of prime ministerial power that is favorable to the prime minister.

No abstract

Constitutional conventions are fundamental to the operation of Westminster democracies. However, despite their political significance, there have been few attempts to analyse and theorise their internal dynamics. This article aims to address this gap by identifying the triggers of constitutional ‘softening’, when the opportunity for convention change emerges; and examining how such moments interact with the particular properties of a convention to determine its change trajectory. We argue that the change trajectories of constitutional conventions are not entirely unpredictable but can be traced to particular kinds of change events and the particular set of features inherent to that convention.