The privacy role of information intermediaries through self-regulation

Abstract

Through qualitative analysis of the policies of two major global information intermediaries -Google and Microsoft -and related case studies, this paper demonstrates a) that intermediaries' participation in self-regulatory programmes and implementation of privacy principles does not necessarily translate into meaningful privacy safeguards for users in the face of growing private surveillance capacity; and b) that within the EU and US self-regulatory frameworks, information intermediaries have discretionary power to set their policies and practices prioritising strategic interests over privacy commitments. Discussions in this paper complement existing studies on the implementation of privacy principles stipulated in Fair Information Practices (FIPs) by enhancing understanding about the role of information intermediaries in defining privacy conditions of users within self-regulation.

Understanding Infrastructure as (Internet) Governance

“…Furthermore, contributions drawing from STS approaches in recent years have not only recognized that administrative and coordinating functions related to Internet infrastructure have always been instruments of power (DeNardis, 2009), but that points of infrastructural control, regardless of their originally intended function, can serve as proxies to regain (or gain) control or manipulate the flow of money, information, and the marketplace of ideas in the digital sphere -a phenomenon which has been called the "turn to infrastructure in Internet governance" (Musiani et al, 2016). This body of work addresses, for example, the use of the Domain Name System (DNS) as a tool for intellectual property rights enforcement (Merrill, 2016) or information intermediaries' discretionary power to set their infrastructural practices prioritizing strategic interests over privacy commitments (Sargsyan, 2016). Put together, these contributions show a shift from a "values-in-design" approach (Flanagan, Howe & Nissenbaum, 2008) to a politicization of Internet governance infrastructures (DeNardis, 2009).…”

Infrastructuringdigital sovereignty: a research agenda for an infrastructure-based sociology of digital self-determination practices

“…This body of work addresses e.g. the use of the domain name system (DNS) as a tool for intellectual property rights enforcement (Merrill, 2016), the discretionary power of information intermediaries to prioritise strategic interests over privacy commitments in their infrastructural practices (Sargsyan, 2016), or the interplay (and conflict) of technical and political governance in decentralized technologies such as the blockchain that forms the backbone of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency (De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016).…”

Science and Technology Studies Approaches to Internet Governance: Controversies and Infrastructures as Internet Politics

“…Furthermore, contributions drawing from STS approaches in recent years have recognized not only that administrative and coordinating functions related to Internet infrastructure have always been instruments of power (DeNardis 2009) but that points of infrastructural control, regardless of their originally intended function, can serve as proxies to regain (or gain) control of or manipulate the flow of money, information, and the marketplace of ideas in the digital sphere-a phenomenon that has been called the "turn to infrastructure in Internet governance" . This body of work addresses, for example, the use of the DNS as a tool for intellectual property rights enforcement (Merrill 2016) or information intermediaries' discretionary power to set their infrastructural practices to prioritize strategic interests over privacy commitments (Sargsyan 2016). Put together, these contributions show a shift from a "values-in-design" approach (Flanagan, Howe, and Nissenbaum 2008) to a politicization of Internet governance infrastructures (DeNardis 2009).…”