The problem of evil: Two neglected defences

Forrest, Peter

doi:10.1007/bf02782747

Cited by 30 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…9 See, for example, Plantinga (1974b, 61);Schlesinger (1977);Forrest (1981); Reichenbach (1982, 121-9); and Swinburne (1979, 114-5). 10 This, of course, is a version of the problem of evil.…”

Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a historical survey of manyuniverse hypotheses, see Munitz (1951). Those who take seriously the idea that theism suggests the multiverse include John McHarry (1978);Peter Forrest (1981, 1996Michael Coughlan (1987);Donald Turner (2003);Paul Draper (2004); Hud Hudson (2006), andTimothy O'Connor (2008). 19 For good introductory surveys of arguments for the multiverse grounded in physics and cosmology, see Leslie (1989, Chapter 4) andMax Tegmark (2003).…”

Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Turner (2004) suggests that it is a partial solution, and O'Connor (2008, Section 5.3.1) sees prospects for theodicy here. More elaborate multiverse-based responses can be found in Forrest (1996) and Hudson (2006). Draper (2004) is the only philosopher to criticize the multiverse-based response to the problem of evil, though he does not directly address these authors.…”

Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse

Kraay

2008

Philos Stud

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God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism.

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Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Objection To Theism On Eouwmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse

Kraay

2008

Philos Stud

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“…Leibniz (1710Leibniz ( /1951 famously claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds, so the 3-O God is consistent with any evil in it. Some claim that there is no best possible world and we cannot fault the 3-O God for not actualizing something that cannot possibly exist (see, e.g., Schlesinger 1964and Forrest 1981. Others claim that the evils in our world are consistent with the 3-O God because these evils serve a purpose, e.g., they develop our spirit or are "soul making" (see, e.g., Hick 1966).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Evil and the many universes response

Megill

2010

Int J Philos Relig

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I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. It follows that we cannot know that the atheistic argument from evil is sound, in which case we cannot be certain that the argument succeeds, and so it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments.

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“…15 (Murray 2008). 16 (Forrest 1981). See also (Alexander 2012), a book devoted to exploring some implications of the attributive account of goodness for various issues in the philosophy of religion.…”

Section: (Thomson 2003)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness

Wiland¹

2018

Religions

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I consider the two venerated arguments about the existence of God: the Ontological Argument and the Argument from Evil. The Ontological Argument purports to show that God's nature guarantees that God exists. The Argument from Evil purports to show that God's nature, combined with some plausible facts about the way the world is, guarantees (or is very compelling grounds for thinking) that God does not exist. Both presume that it is coherent to predicate goodness (or greatness) of God. But if Peter Geach's claim that goodness is logically attributive is cogent, then both arguments fall to the ground.

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The problem of evil: Two neglected defences

Cited by 30 publications

References 2 publications

Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse

Theism, possible worlds, and the multiverse

Evil and the many universes response

The Problem of Evil and the Grammar of Goodness

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