A vivid regional and international debate on the significance of local politics and the respective actors came back to life after the Arab uprisings in 2011, which initiated decentralisation reforms in several MENA countries. Decentralisation advocates expect the reforms to foster democratisation, local autonomy and the overall socioeconomic situation, but Middle Eastern regimes also engage in decentralisation reforms for the sake of their own durability. This article assesses the potential of decentralisation reforms to develop mechanisms that contribute to authoritarian upgrading. We systematically include subnational politics and dynamics, as they are essential for deepening our understanding of the potential for reforms to uphold non-democratic regimes. Decentralisation is a promising test case, as the delegation of power away from the centre towards subnational actors and institutions affects the regime's ability to control the polity. In our analysis, we focus on three salient aspects that influence the outcome of a decentralisation reform: (1) the legal outline of decentralisation, (2) its financial organisation as well as ( 3) the management of central, regional, and local elite networks. Subnational authoritarian upgrading via decentralisation reforms in Jordan and Morocco seem to focus on the satisfaction and containment of civil society as well as on the management and control of elites and oppositional actors.