The Pseudoparadox of Partisan Mapmaking and Congressional Competition

Abstract

Why are fewer congressional elections competitive at the district level when the national electoral environment is at its most competitive? This article explores this “pseudoparadox,” and argues that the answer can be found in partisan redistricting. Through an analysis of 40 years of congressional elections, I find that partisan gerrymanders induce greater competitiveness as national tides increase, largely due to unanticipated consequences of waves adverse to the map-drawing party, particularly in seats held by that party. The phenomenon anecdotally coined by Grofman and Brunell as the “dummymander” is thus actually quite common and has significant effects on rates of congressional competition nationally. In contrast, bipartisan maps are shown to induce lower competition, while nonpartisan maps induce higher competition, under all electoral conditions and competitiveness measures. But the effects of partisan gerrymanders on competition, though strong, can only be seen in interaction with short-term national forces.

Dueling Incumbent House Elections, 1843-2018

“…In many instances there also exists a nontrivial segment of the district population comprised of redrawn voters new to both incumbents. 12 Depending on the partisan bent of these voters, and the direction of the partisan tide (Goedert, 2017), redrawn voters can be the pivotal group in determining the outcome. Additionally, we addressed the ability of majority parties to target the out-party.…”

Pennsylvania in 2018: How Redistricting Does and Doesn’t Make a Difference

“…In the context of redistricting, the declining incumbency advantage (Jacobson 2015) necessarily elevates party affiliation over cultivating a personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). These developments account for a reduction in the frequency of observing "dummymanders" (Grofman and Brunell 2005), partisan plans that backfired because of faulty assumptions regarding voter behavior (Petrocik and Desposato 1998) and/or political conditions unexpectedly shifted to the advantage of the targeted out-party (Goedert 2017;Seabrook 2017).…”