The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect

Abstract

Practice theory provides important insights into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited, however, by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm/normative theory. Building on existing critiques, we argue that analysing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s practice-based account of the Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of ‘ethical competence’, we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence — for example, ‘penholding’ — can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material, we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, the UK and the US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement the Responsibility to Protect. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the permanent three’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of Responsibility to Protect-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm/normative theory.

Practice theory and change in international law: theorizing the development of legal meaning through the interpretive practices of international criminal courts

“…Indeed, it may well be the case that the way in which international criminal courts developed the law of war crimes corresponded to changing social norms, for example 19 . Following-up on Ralph and Gifkins’ (2017) suggestion, one particularly fruitful area for further research would therefore be to inquire whether such a development exhibited what Mervyn Frost (2009) calls ‘ethical competence,’ in addition to (generally) being perceived as valid by a community of international lawyers.…”

“…Finally, what has remained unaccounted for in this analysis of change in legal meaning in international criminal law is the normative direction of such change. As Jason Ralph and Jess Gifkins convincingly argued, practice theory not only has difficulties with capturing when, how and why change happens, but also ‘has little to say about whether change, when it happens, is progressive’ (Ralph and Gifkins 2017, 635). Unlike the idea of a ‘wiggle room’ in which change is confined to the erratic (Adler and Pouliot 2011b, 7), by referring back to previous jurisprudence, change in legal meaning through judicial interpretation may attain such a sense of direction.…”

How can we criticize international practices?

“…Just as Boltanski did in sociology, some of them have begun to articulate a more comprehensive pragmatic critique of practices outside academia. Ralph and Gifkins (2017), whose argument we will discuss in greater detail below, problematize the mistrust created through specific practices in the UN Security Council, a theme that also features prominently in a more recent article by Ralph (2018). Cochran's work on the governance of nuclear weapons also addresses mistrust as a problem that pragmatic critique seeks to overcome.…”

Reflective practices at the Security Council: Children and armed conflict and the three United Nations

“… Adler and Pouliot, 2011a , 2011b ; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014 ; Bueger and Gadinger, 2014 ; Frost and Lechner, 2016 ; Neumann, 2002 ; Pouliot, 2008 ; Schindler and Wille, 2015 ; Sending, 2015 ). Practice theories have presented innovative accounts of UNSC decision-making, but also only consider state input in UNSC outcomes ( Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014 ; Ralph and Gifkins, 2016 ). As conceptual sites, practices are equally based on the characteristics of actors and the constraints/opportunities inherent to social structures ( Bode, 2015 : 18).…”