No abstract

Practice theory provides important insights into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited, however, by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm/normative theory. Building on existing critiques, we argue that analysing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s practice-based account of the Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of ‘ethical competence’, we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence — for example, ‘penholding’ — can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material, we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, the UK and the US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement the Responsibility to Protect. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the permanent three’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of Responsibility to Protect-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm/normative theory.

The international response to the crisis in Libya

It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the UN Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention than there was afterwards. Yet a close examination of the Security Council's use of language on R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security Council prior to the Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council used R2P language more frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has become quicker and easier. To demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with deliberations during and after the Arab Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first time the Security Council referred to R2P in a country-specific resolution -and indeed it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to R2P before 2011 -making it an apt point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language used in Security Council resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council has found 'agreed language' on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions and country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to commonplace.