Libya and the state of intervention

Dunne, Tim; Gifkins, Jess

doi:10.1080/10357718.2011.613148

Cited by 40 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…UN officials noted that the violence could amount to crimes against humanity. 38 The Libyan crisis was immediately framed as a protection issue: Australia, a UNSC rotating member, advocated a civilian-focused solution under the responsibility to protect, 39 while the Secretary-General reminded Tripoli of its civilian protection responsibilities. 40 By the end of February 2011 the predominant view was that diplomatic measures would be insufficient to prevent a massive loss of life.…”

Section: Libyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars

Fung

2015

Third World Quarterly

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Section: Libyamentioning

confidence: 99%

Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars

Fung

2015

Third World Quarterly

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“…Resolution 1973 passed with 10 affirmative votes (nine being the minimum) and five abstentions (Brazil, Russia, India, China and Germany). This demonstrated the P3’s success in securing enough support, but also demonstrated real divisions, especially in a context where 91% of Council resolutions between 2000 and 2010 passed unanimously ( Dunne and Gifkins, 2011 : 523). Indeed, without the affirmative votes from South Africa, which came down to the wire, and Nigeria, who said they would vote with South Africa, the resolution would have failed ( Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014 : 904; see also Cooper and Myers, 2011 ).…”

Section: Security Council Practice and The Intervention In Libyamentioning

confidence: 91%

The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect

Ralph

Gifkins

2016

European Journal of International Relations

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Practice theory provides important insights into the workings of the Security Council. The contribution is currently limited, however, by the conjecture that practice theory operates on ‘a different analytical plane’ to norm/normative theory. Building on existing critiques, we argue that analysing practices separately from normative positions risks misappropriating competence and reifying practice that is not fit for purpose. This risk is realized in Adler-Nissen and Pouliot’s practice-based account of the Libya crisis. By returning the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect to the analytical foreground, and by drawing on a pragmatic conception of ‘ethical competence’, we find that pre-reflexive practices uncritically accepted as markers of competence — for example, ‘penholding’ — can contribute to the Council’s failure to act collectively in the face of mass atrocity. Drawing on extensive interview material, we offer an alternative account of the Libya intervention, finding that the practices of the permanent three (France, the UK and the US) did not cultivate the kind of collective consciousness that is required to implement the Responsibility to Protect. This is further illustrated by an account of the Security Council’s failure in Syria, where the permanent three’s insistence on regime change instrumentalized the Council at the expense of Responsibility to Protect-appropriate practice. This changed when elected members became ‘penholders’. Practice theory can facilitate learning processes that help the Council meet its responsibilities, but only through an approach that combines its insights with those of norm/normative theory.

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“…Anti-Gaddafi protests began in mid-February 2011 in Benghazi and were met by the indiscriminate use of force by the Libyan regime. The crisis was framed in the context of the responsibility to protect from the outset (Dunne and Gifkins, 2011), and UN officials noted that the violence could amount to crimes against humanity (UN News Centre, 2011; UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 2011). By the end of February 2011, diplomatic pressure continued to build on Libya, and the predominant view was that diplomatic measures alone would be insufficient to prevent a massive loss of life (UN General Assembly, 2011).…”

Section: Case Study Of China’s Engagement With the Responsibility To mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 When UN Security Council Resolutions were used to justify Libyan regime change, much to the displeasure of China, responsibility to protect advocates noted that Libya was ‘a textbook case of the … norm working exactly as it was supposed to’ (Evans, 2011). Much of the existing literature emphasizes the dominance of Western states in engineering the UN Security Council’s response to the Libya crisis (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014; Dunne and Gifkins, 2011; Glanville, 2016; Vaughn and Dunne, 2015). I offer a contrasting view that emphasizes China’s contributions in shaping the path to UN Security Council outcomes, in part due to China’s use of rhetorical adaptation (see Fung, 2016a, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rhetorical adaptation, normative resistance and international order-making: China’s advancement of the responsibility to protect

Fung¹

2019

Cooperation and Conflict

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How do rising powers execute normative resistance to shape international order? Contrary to the existing literature, I argue that rising powers are productive agents of normative change and international order-making, through the use of rhetorical adaptation to contest pre-existing orders. Rhetorical adaptation is a strategy and set of tactics that simultaneously modifies norm content, while reducing critiques of obstructionism. To make this argument, this article traces China’s efforts as a ‘norm shaper’ regarding the responsibility to protect through the inception, institutionalization and implementation of the norm in the landmark 2011 Libya intervention. China layers traditional sovereignty norms under the responsibility to protect, focusing and narrowing the emerging norm by fortifying the primacy of the state. While I show how China resists co-option into an evolving ontological order that challenges traditional sovereignty, the article also addresses the unforeseen consequences of China’s normative efforts that ‘backfired’ to permit the use of the responsibility to protect to justify Libyan regime change. More broadly, this article speaks to rising powers as agents crafting international order, and the process of normative resistance that occurs throughout the norm life cycle. I draw from publicly available documents and semi-structured interviews with Chinese foreign policy and United Nations elites.

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Libya and the state of intervention

Abstract: The international response to the crisis in Libya

Cited by 40 publications

References 10 publications

Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars

Global South solidarity? China, regional organisations and intervention in the Libyan and Syrian civil wars

The purpose of United Nations Security Council practice: Contesting competence claims in the normative context created by the Responsibility to Protect

Rhetorical adaptation, normative resistance and international order-making: China’s advancement of the responsibility to protect

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