The Purposes and Functions of Exclusionary Rules: A Comparative Overview

Abstract

The chapter analyzes the rationales for excluding relevant evidence with the aim of establishing the ideal type of exclusion system for each rationale. The authors then review to what extent individual legal systems have actually altered their legal rules in accordance with these ideal systems. An investigation into whether or not there are any consistent relationships between the ideal systems and proclaimed rationales is conducted. The structure of various exclusionary rules is also explored, as are other factors that may influence the law and practical application of such rules.

Exclusion of evidence in times of mass surveillance. In search of a principled approach to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in criminal cases in the European Union

“…Moreover, if evidence is unreliable, it can never be said that further information was found in consequence of it. On the contrary, exclusion of derivative evidence can strengthen the aims pursued by the other rationales (protective, disciplinary, integrity) in that the widening of exclusion can offer greater redress to the violations of the suspect's rights, or tighten the punishment for disobeying officers or help establish greater legitimacy of the judicial process (Turner and Weigend, 2019: 265). With regard to the disciplinary rationale, the exclusion of derivative evidence can add to the deterrent effect by discouraging, more affirmatively, any deviant behaviour of public authorities (Turner and Weigend, 2019: 268).…”

“…On the contrary, exclusion of derivative evidence can strengthen the aims pursued by the other rationales (protective, disciplinary, integrity) in that the widening of exclusion can offer greater redress to the violations of the suspect's rights, or tighten the punishment for disobeying officers or help establish greater legitimacy of the judicial process (Turner and Weigend, 2019: 265). With regard to the disciplinary rationale, the exclusion of derivative evidence can add to the deterrent effect by discouraging, more affirmatively, any deviant behaviour of public authorities (Turner and Weigend, 2019: 268). The integrity of the judicial system might also require that the evidence subsequently obtained be removed from the file of available evidence, in order to ensure—or assure—greater credibility in the administration of justice.…”

“… 3. The normative justifications for exclusion of illegally obtained evidence have been the subject of various academic contributions, particularly in Anglo-American scholarship: see e.g. Ashworth (1977: 723, 2003); Ashworth and Redmayne (2010: 344–348 – this section was omitted in the most recent edition Campbell et al (2019)); Choo (2018: 161–162); Dennis (1989: 21); Kamisar (1983: 565); Jackson and Summers (2012: 153–158); Mirfield (1997: chs 2 and 6); Monaghan (2015: 158–163); Ormerod and Birch (2004: 767, 778–784); Roberts and Zuckerman (2010: 179–191); Turner and Weigend (2019); Zuckerman (1987: 55).…”

Procedural Aspects of Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings

“…Atsižvelgiant į teisinio reguliavimo įvairovę, procedūriniai įrodymų leistinumo aspektai dažniausiai nagrinėjami remiantis konkrečių valstybių teisiniu reguliavimu. Paminėtini autoriai, nagrinėję procedūrinius įrodymų leistinumo aspektus Graikijos (Giannoulopoulos, 2017(Giannoulopoulos, , 2019, Šveicarijos (Macula, 2019), Vokietijos (Weigend, 2019) teisės sistemose. Bendrą teorinį požiūrį iš skirtingų teisės tradicijų perspektyvų pateikė M. R. Damaška (1997), J. D. Jackson ir S. J.…”

Racjonalna regulacja karnoprocesowej dopuszczalności dowodów uzyskanych z naruszeniem praw jednostki

“…Warto zresztą odnotować, że odwołanie do uzasadnienia w postaci konieczności reakcji na naruszenie praw jednostki może przybrać przynajmniej kilka różnych form 16 . Należy również dostrzec, że w literaturze podnosi się, iż w praktyce stosowania prawa nawet wyraźne odwołanie się do określonej racjonalizacji sankcjonowania nielegalnie uzyskanych dowodów nie musi determinować decyzji zapadających w sprawach indywidualnych 17 , gdyż często są one wypadkową uwzględniania ad hoc różnych pozostających z sobą w konflikcie racji. Niemniej jednak nie dyskwalifikuje to celowości określenia choćby ogólnych priorytetów aksjologicznych, które będą determinować wybory sędziów.…”