The quasifirm in the construction industry

Eccles, Robert G.

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(81)90013-5

Cited by 675 publications

(378 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…The market, on the other hand, coordinates the flow of materials between independent economic entities through the use of the price mechanism reflecting the underlying forces of supply and demand. Taking the firm and the market as pure forms, several intermediate governance mechanisms have been identified: long-term relational contracts (MacNeil, 1980; Stinchcombe, 1990), joint ventures (Harrigan, 1988), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), and quasi-integration (Blois, 1972); more generally, such mechanisms exemplify non-classical and hybrid forms of contracting (Williamson, 1990).…”

Section: Mechanisms For Organizational Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test

1994

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Section: Mechanisms For Organizational Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test

1994

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“…Prices are no longer sufficient statistics. Longterm relational contracts (Masten & Crocker, 1985;Mulherin, 1986;Wiggins & Libecap, 1985), impartition policies (Barreyre, 1988), tapered and quasi-integration (Porter, 1980), joint ventures (Harrigan, 1988), franchising (John, 1984;Norton, 1988;Rubin, 1978), networks (Jarillo, 1988: Thorelli, 1986), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), hybrids (Borys & Jemison, 1989), and "vertical financial ownership" (Flaherty, 1981) are some of the "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) which emerged in response to the inadequacies of "classical market contracting" (Macneil, 1980). The generalizable thesis of the transaction cost literature is that the particular institution (governance structure) chosen to implement the strategy of vertical integration mainly serves efficiency purposes (Bork, 1978;Williamson, 1985 (Simon, 1978 Contractual problems become acute when there are small numbers bargaining, a situation that occurs when transactions involve human, physical or site "asset specificity" (Spiller, 1985;Williamson, 1979 (Joskow, 1985a Goldberg & Erickson, 1987;Hennart 1988b;Klein, 1988;Palay, 1984;Teece, 1976), formal modeling (Kleindorfer & Knieps, 1982;Masten, 1982;Riordan & Williamson, 1985) and statistical testing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984;Armour & Teece, 1980;Caves & Bradburd, 1988;Heide & John, 1988;...…”

Section: The Advantages Of Vertical Integration Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Mahoney

1992

Strategic Management Journal

360

253

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“…It is likely that certain types of concerns are best addressed through formal protection whereas others require social mechanisms to be invoked. While contracts and courts are a valid deterrent to opportunistic behavior, scholars have shown that these are in reality rarely invoked explicitly (Eccles 1981;Mayer and Argyres 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Liberty in Law? Intellectual Property Rights and Global Alliance Networks

Balachandran

Hernandez

2016

AMPROC

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Do formal legal institutions complement or substitute social network mechanisms of knowledge protection? We explore how the composition and structure of firms' international alliance networks changes in response to the passage of intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in their home countries. We find that, when IPR laws are strengthened, firms form more international alliances, particularly if they operate in IP intensive industries, and do so with partners from a greater diversity of countries. The significance of status (centrality) as a predictor of international alliance formation decreased after the passage of IPR laws, in line with a substitution effect that 'democratized' access to the global network by increasing the participation of firms that were peripheral before the legal changes. In contrast, the closure of firms' alliance networks increased with stronger IPR laws, in line with a complementarity effect that increased the use of social control. The increase in closure was strongest in the networks of the low status entrants into the global network. Using a difference-indifference empirical design, we found that these changes coincided exactly with the timing of the passage of the laws across thirteen countries between 1988 and 2005. This study addresses issues of great theoretical and practical importance to the literatures on institutions, networks, and IPR. Abstract: Do formal legal institutions complement or substitute social network mechanisms of knowledge protection? We explore how the composition and structure of firms' international alliance networks changes in response to the passage of intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in their home countries. We find that, when IPR laws are strengthened, firms form more international alliances, particularly if they operate in IP intensive industries, and do so with partners from a greater diversity of countries. The significance of status (centrality) as a predictor of international alliance formation decreased after the passage of IPR laws, in line with a substitution effect that 'democratized' access to the global network by increasing the participation of firms that were peripheral before the legal changes. In contrast, the closure of firms' alliance networks increased with stronger IPR laws, in line with a complementarity effect that increased the use of social control. The increase in closure was strongest in the networks of the low status entrants into the global network. Using a difference-in-difference empirical design, we found that these changes coincided exactly with the timing of the passage of the laws across thirteen countries between 1988 and 2005. This study addresses issues of great theoretical and practical importance to the literatures on institutions, networks, and IPR. In an increasingly knowledge-based economy, interfirm collaborations are essential for many firms and industries. These collaborations are often globally dispersed because knowledge and resources are widely distributed across countries (Rosenkopf and Almei...

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The quasifirm in the construction industry

Cited by 675 publications

References 4 publications

Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test

Determinants of Electronic Integration in the Insurance Industry: An Empirical Test

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Liberty in Law? Intellectual Property Rights and Global Alliance Networks

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