The Quest for Good Governance

Abstract

Why do some societies manage to control corruption so that it manifests itself only occasionally, while other societies remain systemically corrupt? This book is about how societies reach that point when integrity becomes the norm and corruption the exception in regard to how public affairs are run and public resources are allocated. It primarily asks what lessons we have learned from historical and contemporary experiences in developing corruption control, which can aid policy-makers and civil societies in steering and expediting this process. Few states now remain without either an anticorruption agency or an Ombudsman, yet no statistical evidence can be found that they actually induce progress. Using both historical and contemporary studies and easy to understand statistics, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi looks at how to diagnose, measure and change governance so that those entrusted with power and authority manage to defend public resources.

Why Are the Poor More Vulnerable to Bribery in Africa? The Institutional Effects of Services

“…These conditions are less likely to be met by poor Africans (Bratton et al, 2005). Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) interprets the absence or weakness of voice to reduce corruption in developing countries as a low-level equilibrium trap in which the institutionalisation of an unequal distribution of power enables those who collect bribes to prevent the disruption of a system from which they benefit. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007) include a variable that they label as measuring contact but this is a flawed measure of contact because respondents not having contact were given two non-mutually exclusive response options to the bribery questions: They could say that they had 'never paid a bribe' or had 'no experience' with the service.…”

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

“…State capture has two distinctive forms, “corporate state capture” and “party state capture” (Innes ). In the first version, oligarchs are the captors (clients) of state institutions, while in the second form, the separation between the politician (agent) and the businessmen (client) is more difficult (Mungiu‐Pippidi , 34). Here the beneficiaries of the particularistic redistribution and the redistributors are both members of the same political elite.…”

“…Macro‐level cross‐sectional studies conclude that rewards, specifically higher government wages, have limited or no contribution to lowering levels of corruption (Alt and Lassen ; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell ; Treisman ). Moreover, the presence of a dedicated anticorruption agency in a country has no significant effect on the control of corruption (Mungiu‐Pippidi, , 106–9). In contrast to the common argument that strong legal systems are key anticorruption components, cross‐country models suggest the opposite: corruption undermines the rule of law, which, in turn, increases corruption and reduces the probability of being detected and punished (Herzfelda and Weiss ).…”

From data extraction to data leaking. Data-activism in Italian and Spanish anti-corruption campaigns

“…In the past few years, scholars who investigate anti--corruption strategies have recognized the importance of civil society actors to limit corruption (e.g., Hough 2017, Rotberg 2017, Rose--Ackerman and Palifka 2016, Johnston 2014, with recent findings suggest--ing that there is a positive correlation between high numbers of civil society actors and more effective control of corruption (Mungiu--Pippidi 2015). Along these lines, some studies have empirically investigated the characteristics of bottom--up efforts against corruption at the national level, showing their relevance in the production of contextu--al understanding of corruption linked to the territories in which they act (Walton 2017); the formulation of specific demands to increase anti--corruption policies (Hough 2013, Johnston 2005; the production of discourses against corruption linked to other contentious issues like environmentalism (Torsello 2012); and the experimentation with different forms of collective actions (Beyerle 2014)…”