The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets

Abstract

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Capacity Mechanisms on Central European Electricity Markets: Effects on Consumers, Producers and Technologies Until 2033

“…Moreover, high electricity prices are under supervision of competition authorities, and are influenced by further policy measures which obscure the revelation of costs through these markets. In addition, it is argued that power plant projects are time consuming so that scarcity prices that correctly signal the demand for capacity may prevail until the new capacities are built and potentially create large transfers from consumers to producers (Oren (2003), de Vries and Hakvoort (2004)). These arguments lead to the suspicion of possible market failure regarding incentives to build adequate capacity, and a related call for capacity support instruments especially in times of 3 See for instance the energy intensity of the economy documented at Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.…”

An improved mechanism for capacity payment based on system dynamics modeling for investment planning in competitive electricity environment

“…Capacity payments, establishing a capacity market and introducing the reliability contracts have been known as methods used for preventing long-term fluctuations in investment (de Vries and Hakvoort, 2003). In capacity payment method, a fixed payment is paid to a unit who is available for electricity generation to recover a portion of its investment in the long run.…”

Critical Infrastructures at Risk

“…5 Here we will provide a synopsis; a more extensive argument can be found in De Vries andHakvoort (2003) andin De Vries (2004).…”