The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets

Miyazaki, Hajime

doi:10.2307/3003294

Cited by 365 publications

(234 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…(Wilson [1977] Given the ad hoc nature of Wilson's solution concept, it is to be expected that a coincidence as in Corollary 8.2 will not hold in general. However, the authors conjecture that for a broa.d class of signaling games that have similaz structura.l properties as the game studied in this paper, the HS solution coincides with the solution proposed in Miyazaki [1977]. (The important properties are monotonicity and the single crossing condition, see Cho and Sobel [1977], it is conjectured that the number of types does not play a role).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game

Damme¹,

Güth²

1991

Game Equilibrium Models II

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game

Damme¹,

Güth²

1991

Game Equilibrium Models II

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“…The first is the so-called WMS equilibrium approach (Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977 , Spence (1978)) which has found a game-theoretic basis in the work by Hellwig (1987). In this approach, cross-subsidizing equilibrium contracts are possible, as for any deviating menu of contract, the insurers can react by withdrawing their contracts.…”

Section: Multiple Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market With Asymmetric Information

Sonnenholzner¹,

Wambach²

2009

J of Risk & Insurance

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We analyze a two-period competitive insurance market that is characterized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which patient consumers use high effort and buy an insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient consumers use low effort and buy a contract with low coverage or even remain uninsured. This finding may help to explain why the opposite of adverse selection with regard to risk types can sometimes be observed empirically. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2009.

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“…Pour une démonstration analytique, on pourra consulter Henry [1985]. Pour d'autres analyses du rôle des subventions dans l'efficacité du secteur des assurances voir Miyazaki [1977] et Spence [1978]. On peut montrer que l'optimum public avec subventions domine toujours la situation obtenue avec un monopole privé (Stiglitz [1977]).…”

Section: -Les Tarifs éQuitables Sont-ils Vraiment Souhaitables ?unclassified

Vers une tarification équitable de l’assurance?

Rochet

2009

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L’intensification de la concurrence sur certains marchés d’assurance a encouragé l’émergence du principe de la personnalisation des primes, qui s’oppose au traditionnel principe de mutualisation des risques. Menée à son extrême, la personnalisation conduirait à une tarification « équitable » de l’assurance, c’est-à-dire telle que la prime de chaque assuré est exactement proportionnée au risque qu’il représente. Cet article se propose de répondre à deux questions :1) comment construire un tarif équitable, compte tenu de l’imperfection des critères à la disposition de l’assureur?2) un tarif équitable est-il vraiment souhaitable?The intensification of competition on insurance markets is giving more and more audience to the principle of premiums personalization. Antagonistic to the traditional principe of risks mutualization, this new trend aims at "equitable" insurance tariffs, i.e. tariffs such that premiums are exactly proportioned to risks. This article is concerned with two questions:1. Is it possible to design such equitable tariffs, considering the fact that insurers have only incomplete information about the insured?2. Are equitable tariffs really desirable

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The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets

Cited by 365 publications

References 7 publications

Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game

Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game

On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market With Asymmetric Information

Vers une tarification équitable de l’assurance?

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