The Rational Roles of Intuition

Abstract

Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action--guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through inference. According to inferential internalists, in order to gain justification for believing the conclusion of an argument by inferring it from the premises in that argument one must "see" that the premises support the conclusion. 2 We have attitudes-beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, intentions-and we perform actions-mental ones such as counting sheep before falling asleep and bodily ones such as making the bed after waking up. Some of these attitudes and actions are more reasonable than others. We have experiences, such as perceptions, bodily sensations, recollections, imaginings, and-I would add-intuitions. Some of these play roles in making some of our attitudes and actions more reasonable than others. By the rational roles of a type of experience I mean the roles experiences of that type play in making some of our attitudes and actions more reasonable than others.In this paper I will explore the rational roles intuitions play. Two have been discussed widely recently:Justifier: Intuitions justify beliefs.Evidence: Intuitions are evidence for beliefs.

Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

“…24 Thanks to the editors for raising this point. 25 This abstracts away from the possibility that inference involves an additional intentional state like an intuition (Chudnoff, 2014), which is not relevant to the distinction between belief and seemings. 26 Modern dual-component views appear especially committed to the claim that seemings require the construction of an additional representation when one considers the putative epistemological function of seemings on (at least some of) these views.…”

“…This abstracts away from the possibility that inference involves an additional intentional state like an intuition (Chudnoff, ), which is not relevant to the distinction between belief and seemings.…”

Against the Taking Condition

“…But other interpretations are also possible. Some philosophers have suggested that taking is a representational state which falls short of belief, such as an intuition, understood as a kind of intellectual seeming (Chudnoff , Tucker ). Others have suggested that taking is a sui generis state (Boghossian , Hlobil ms).…”

“…Besides Boghossian, defenders of the Taking Condition include Tucker (), Neta (), Broome (), Chudnoff (), Valaris (forthcoming), and Hlobil (ms).…”

“…For example, perhaps one simply has an intuition that the fingerprints on the weapon support the conclusion that the butler did it. However, if such intuitions are always involved in inference, it's not clear why reasoners should also have to form beliefs on the basis of them; it would be more plausible simply to endorse a version of the Taking Condition that construes taking as intuition (Tucker , Chudnoff ).…”