The Real Trouble with Phenomenal Externalism: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain-Based Theory of Consciousness

Pautz, Adam

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_18

Cited by 40 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 52 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In short, the point is that absent empirical evidence that the function of color 14 This approach is by no means peculiar to me. It is central to the arguments against physicalism by Allen (2016) and Pautz (2013). 15 The point of Chapter 8 is to argue that this outer-directedness is not incompatible with color relationism.…”

Section: Reply To Mohan Matthenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Pace Pautz (). Chirimuuta () gives the argument that non‐empirical theoretical suppositions play an important role in color constancy research and therefore cannot decide between philosophical theories. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… This approach is by no means peculiar to me. It is central to the arguments against physicalism by Allen () and Pautz (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Replies

Chirimuuta

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Reply To Mohan Matthenmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Replies

Chirimuuta

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…13 Appealing to this fact, Pautz (2011Pautz ( , 2014Pautz ( , 2017 has argued the following: Suppose you have a twin who belongs to a human-like species. The cross-species similarity ensures that under the same extra-dermal conditions, your and your twin's perceptual systems causally interact with the same environmental items, and exhibit post-receptoral neural response patterns that track the same environmental items to the same optimal degree.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking naive realism

Beck

2018

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Perceptions are externally-directed-they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependenttheir phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive realism, often called ''selectionism'', does indeed struggle with internal-dependence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin's, accommodates the internal-dependence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject's neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions.

show abstract

“… See, for example, Burge (, ). The empirical literature employed by, for example, color irrealists or relationalists (e.g., Chirimuuta ; Cohen ) or phenomenal internalists (e.g., Pautz ), as well as the literature on systematic misperception (e.g., Mendelovici , Hill , part III, and his comments on McDowell at the conference, Hatfield , e.g., ch. 6 & 7) potentially provide further fodder for this line of argument. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%