The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning

Abstract

According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to the familiar defeasibility theory of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory.

Where reasons and reasoning come apart

“…The reasoning view has been defended by several authors in recent years (Asarnow, 2017; Hieronymi, 2005; Hieronymi, 2011; Setiya, 2007; Setiya, 2014; Silverstein, 2016; Way, 2017). 4 For the sake of simplicity, I will in the following work with Way's (2017, p. 254) formulation:

(R1) For the fact that p to be a reason for S to φ is for there to be a good pattern of reasoning from the belief that p, perhaps together with other correct attitudes which S has, to φ‐ing .

…”

“…Think of reasoning as a productive process, by which given mental states give rise to further responses, and which is governed by norms. Sound reasoning may then be thought of as reasoning that is guided by and thereby conforms to these norms (Asarnow, 2017, p. 616; Boghossian, 2014; Broome, 2009).…”

“…As to the distinction between practical and theoretical patterns of reasoning, one might draw it by appeal to their conclusions – good practical reasoning terminates in action, intention, or belief about which of one's options are permitted (Paakkunainen, 2017, p. 65), whereas good theoretical reasoning terminates in belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment (Asarnow, 2017, p. 616). One might also distinguish the two kinds of transition on the grounds of different standards of reasoning, so that “practical reasoning incorporates any form of thought to which assessments of practical rationality apply” (Setiya, 2014, p. 221), while theoretical reasoning is the kind of reasoning to which assessments of theoretical rationality apply.…”

“…For a sound pattern of reasoning towards φ‐ing is a reasoning pattern that results in justified φ‐ing, but normative reasons are typically pro tanto – that there is a reason doesn't guarantee that φ‐ing would be justified. Several solutions to the problem have been suggested (Asarnow, 2017; Pakkunainen, 2017; Setiya, 2014; Silverstein, 2016; Way, 2017). One solution appeals to the different strengths with which good transitions of thought move a subject to their conclusions.…”

Action and Rationalization

“…It is also closely associated with the 'Reasoning View' about normative reasons: seeHieronymi [2011],Silverstein [2016],McHugh and Way [2016a], and Way [2017]. For my version of the Reasoning View, seeAsarnow [2016Asarnow [ , 2017.…”