The Representational Semantic Conception

Abstract

This article argues for a representational semantic conception (RSC) of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely, that theories can be characterized as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of 'models' and 'structures', which we reject. The practice turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modeling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC.

Invisible Hands and Fine Calipers: A Call to Use Formal Theory as a Toolkit for Theory Construction

“…Among philosophers of science, there has been a growing consensus that representation is crucial to the practice of science (Bailer-Jones, 2009; Suárez, 2010). Theories can be understood as models that represent the target system (Suárez & Pero, 2019). As representations of the target system, theories allow us to engage in surrogative reasoning (Swoyer, 1991), using the theory to make predictions about the target system.…”

Modeling Psychopathology: From Data Models to Formal Theories

“…Surrogative reasoning relies on a theory's structure: its components and the relations among them (Pero, 2015;Suárez & Pero, 2019). This structure can be expressed in a written or spoken language (i.e., verbal theory) or in the language of mathematics or computation (i.e., formal theory).…”

“…We argue that this approach provides a clear and promising way forward for using empirical research to inform the generation, development, and testing of formal theories both in the domain of psychopathology and in the broader field of psychological science.Keywords: Theory development, formal theories, network approach, complex dynamical systems, clinical psychology, computational modeling * These three authors contributed equally to this work and are considered joint first authors.1 The precise relationship between theories and models is muddled by inconsistent and often conflicting use of these terms across time, disciplines, and scientists (for a brief history of models and their relation to theory, see Bailer-Jones, 2009). In this paper, we will adopt the perspective that theories are models (Suárez & Pero, 2019). However, the core arguments presented in this paper do not require this precise conceptualization of theories and would similarly hold for pragmatic accounts that regard models as an intermediary between theory and the real world (e.g., Bailer-Jones, 2009;Cartwright, 1983).…”

“…1 The precise relationship between theories and models is muddled by inconsistent and often conflicting use of these terms across time, disciplines, and scientists (for a brief history of models and their relation to theory, see Bailer-Jones, 2009). In this paper, we will adopt the perspective that theories are models (Suárez & Pero, 2019). However, the core arguments presented in this paper do not require this precise conceptualization of theories and would similarly hold for pragmatic accounts that regard models as an intermediary between theory and the real world (e.g., Bailer-Jones, 2009;Cartwright, 1983).…”

Integrating Inferentialism about Physical Theories and Representations: a Case for Phase Space Diagrams

“…This proposal would rely on both inferentialism about scientific representations (Suárez 2004) and inferentialism about particular physical theories (Wallace 2017). I defend that both perspectives somehow converge into an integrated inferentialism by means of the thesis of theories as being composed of representations, as defended from the representational semantic conception defended by Suárez and Pero (2019).…”