2011
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9804-0
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

4
49
0
3

Year Published

2015
2015
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 145 publications
(56 citation statements)
references
References 34 publications
4
49
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…The attempts to explain these diverging experiences over the public choice approach can be classified into two groups. These are the rentier state theory and the theories of illicit rent-seeking (Isham et al 2003;Leite and Weidmann 2002;Acemoglu et al 2004;Busse and Gröning 2013;Mehlum et al 2006). These works deliver interesting extensions of the analytical framework of Sachs and Warner (1995) and provide strong cross-country evidence that resource dependence induces negative growth effects mainly in the countries with inferior (rent-seeking) institutional quality.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The attempts to explain these diverging experiences over the public choice approach can be classified into two groups. These are the rentier state theory and the theories of illicit rent-seeking (Isham et al 2003;Leite and Weidmann 2002;Acemoglu et al 2004;Busse and Gröning 2013;Mehlum et al 2006). These works deliver interesting extensions of the analytical framework of Sachs and Warner (1995) and provide strong cross-country evidence that resource dependence induces negative growth effects mainly in the countries with inferior (rent-seeking) institutional quality.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Busse & Gröning (2013) focus on the first problem. Using instrumental variables to address endogeneity www.annualreviews.org • The Resource Curse 5.11…”
Section: Resources and Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The per capita GDP (PGDP) was used as an indicator, following several studies that considered PGDP as a proxy for the degree of development in a country [32][33][34][35]. There is a strong link between PGDP and human capital.…”
Section: Data and Variables Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Institution Quality (IQ), in the form of corruption and weak law and order, hinders human capital development [47][48][49] This study used corruption (CRP) and law and order (LO) as proxies for institutional quality (IQ) following [34,[50][51][52][53], and data from 1984-2014 were taken from the international country risk guide (ICRG) by the PRS Group [54]. The CRP variable assesses the level of corruption within a political system and includes financial corruption, e.g., demands for special payments and bribes in connection with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, excessive patronage, nepotism, or secret party funding [34,55]. As stated by [51].…”
Section: Data and Variables Descriptionmentioning
confidence: 99%