The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings

doi:10.3982/ecta10011

Cited by 52 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…This approach to minimising self-reporting is based on the revealed preference theory, which is a way to infer the preferences of individuals given the observed choices. The revealed preference theory, which is a theory from microeconomics, essentially states that individuals' actions reveal more about their preferences than their words (Echenique et al 2013;Samuelson 1948…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact and challenges of a public policy implemented in the South African Police Service, Northern Cape

Hoeyi

Makgari

2020

Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review

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The aim is to contribute to the understanding of how SCM policies enhance the service delivery capabilities of government departments. Setting:The setting is SAPS in the Northern Cape province of South Africa. Methods:The study adopted a cross-sectional survey design with a main survey and a follow-up survey being conducted. The main survey involved data collection from 174 staff members while the follow-up survey involved 70 respondents.Results: Statistical analysis of the two sets of data revealed that the SCM policy has had some positive on service delivery. Staffing inadequacy was found to be the biggest challenge. In fact, 12 out of the 15 challenges are attributable to the human factor. Conclusion:The SCM policy has had some positive impact on service delivery in SAPS NC, but there is room for improvement.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact and challenges of a public policy implemented in the South African Police Service, Northern Cape

Hoeyi

Makgari

2020

Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review

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Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents

Meeks

Rastegari

2018

Web and Internet Economics

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Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), the well-known NP-hard matching problem Max SMTI (that of finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belongs to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed to describe the instance. This tractability result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one "exceptional" candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists.

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