The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry's attempts to ‘break the health silo’

Abstract

Background After five years of intense lobbying on 3rd April 2014 the European Union (EU) enacted a revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). However, unlike previous legislation on tobacco, this occurred in a changed policy context, following adoption of both the EU's ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda that the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their policy influence, and Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which seeks to prevent TTC influence. This study aims to explore the scale and nature of the TTCs’ lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how these developments have affected their ability to exert influence. Methods Analysis of 581 documents obtained through freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents obtained via the Legacy Library, web content obtained via Google alerts and searches of the EU institutions’ websites, plus four stakeholder interviews. Results The TTC lobby was massive, with Philip Morris alone employing over 160 lobbyists. Strategies were directed in large part via third parties. Efforts to “Push” (amend) or “Delay” the proposal and block “extreme policy options”, including plain packaging and a point of sales display ban were partially successful. Both were removed from the Directive during its progress through the Commission where a delay of three years occurred. These changes and delays followed a series of meetings between TTC representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and high level Commission staff and were enabled by the operationalisation of Smart Regulation via stakeholder consultation and impact assessment. Contrary to Article 5.3, these meetings were not disclosed. Conclusions During the legislative process, Article 5.3 was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates of the European Commission, while the tools of Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access to, and influence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third parties undermines Article 5.3.

Campaign for a revised Tobacco Products Directive in the European Union: lessons learnt

“…Similar interference proved a recurrent theme during the 2014 TPD revision 20 21. The draft legislation had already been delayed by 18 months as a result of a record-breaking consultation process totalling over 85 000 responses 9.…”

Evidence about electronic cigarettes: a foundation built on rock or sand?

“…26 Most of the lobbying effort concerned packaging of conventional cigarettes. However, there was also a powerful attack on the directive's substantial restrictions on e-cigarettes.…”

Tobacco control in Europe: a policy review

“…It is important to note that the FCTC, of which the European Commission (EC) is one of the Parties, specifies in Article 5.3 that Parties have to take precautionary measures to protect tobacco policies from industry lobbying. The enforcement of this article was quite weak during the process of discussion and approval of the TPD as there were several meetings with tobacco lobbyists that were not publicly disclosed [22]. In addition, there is evidence that tobacco industry interference caused a delay in the legislative process [23].…”