ObjectivesTo explore the history of transnational tobacco companies’ use of the term, approach to and perceived benefits of ‘harm reduction’.MethodsAnalysis of internal tobacco industry documents, contemporary tobacco industry literature and 6 semistructured interviews.ResultsThe 2001 Institute of Medicine report on tobacco harm reduction appears to have been pivotal in shaping industry discourse. Documents suggest British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International adopted the term ‘harm reduction’ from Institute of Medicine, then proceeded to heavily emphasise the term in their corporate messaging. Documents and interviews suggest harm reduction offered the tobacco industry two main benefits: an opportunity to (re-) establish dialogue with and access to policy makers, scientists and public health groups and to secure reputational benefits via an emerging corporate social responsibility agenda.ConclusionsTransnational tobacco companies’ harm reduction discourse should be seen as opportunistic tactical adaptation to policy change rather than a genuine commitment to harm reduction. Care should be taken that this does not undermine gains hitherto secured in efforts to reduce the ability of the tobacco industry to inappropriately influence policy.

ObjectiveThe tobacco industry spends large sums lobbying the European Union (EU) institutions, yet whether such lobbying significantly affects tobacco policy is not well understood. We used novel quantitative text mining techniques to evaluate the impact of industry pressure on the contested EU Tobacco Products Directive revision.DesignPolicy positions of 18 stakeholders including the tobacco industry, health NGOs and tobacco retailers were evaluated using their text submissions to EU consultations and impact assessments. Using Wordscores to calculate word frequencies, we developed a scale ranging from 0–tobacco industry to 1–public health organisations, which was then used to track changes in the policy position of the European Commission's 2010 consultation document, its 2012 final proposal and the European Parliament and Council's approved legislation in March 2014.ResultsSeveral stakeholders’ positions were closer to the tobacco industry than that of health NGOs, including retailers (ω=0.35), trade unions (ω=0.34) and publishers (ω=0.33 and ω=0.40). Over time the European Commission's position shifted towards the tobacco industry from ω=0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54) to ω=0.40 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.42). This transition reflected an increasing use of words pertaining to business and the economy in the Commission's document. Our findings were robust to alternative methods of scoring policy positions in EU documents.ConclusionsUsing quantitative text mining techniques, we observed that tobacco industry lobbying activity at the EU was associated with significant policy shifts in the EU Tobacco Products Directive legislation towards the tobacco industry's submissions. In the light of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, additional governance strategies are needed to prevent undue influence of the tobacco industry on EU policy making.

Background After five years of intense lobbying on 3rd April 2014 the European Union (EU) enacted a revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). However, unlike previous legislation on tobacco, this occurred in a changed policy context, following adoption of both the EU's ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda that the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their policy influence, and Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which seeks to prevent TTC influence. This study aims to explore the scale and nature of the TTCs’ lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how these developments have affected their ability to exert influence. Methods Analysis of 581 documents obtained through freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents obtained via the Legacy Library, web content obtained via Google alerts and searches of the EU institutions’ websites, plus four stakeholder interviews. Results The TTC lobby was massive, with Philip Morris alone employing over 160 lobbyists. Strategies were directed in large part via third parties. Efforts to “Push” (amend) or “Delay” the proposal and block “extreme policy options”, including plain packaging and a point of sales display ban were partially successful. Both were removed from the Directive during its progress through the Commission where a delay of three years occurred. These changes and delays followed a series of meetings between TTC representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and high level Commission staff and were enabled by the operationalisation of Smart Regulation via stakeholder consultation and impact assessment. Contrary to Article 5.3, these meetings were not disclosed. Conclusions During the legislative process, Article 5.3 was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates of the European Commission, while the tools of Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access to, and influence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third parties undermines Article 5.3.

In light lobbying by transnational tobacco companies to remove the European Union ban on the sale of snus (a smokeless tobacco product), Silvy Peeters and Anna Gilmore explore the motivation behind tobacco companies' interests in smokeless tobacco products in Europe. Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary