2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.010
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The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

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Cited by 115 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…As a result, many SEC lawyers that were trying to make a name for themselves became aggressive in getting companies to pay money and punishing them; this is likely one reason why prior to 2010, cooperative firms had a higher likelihood of receiving a sanction from the SEC. This is consistent with the evidence in DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015) that line lawyers build "human capital." However, by centralizing the approval authority for cooperation tools, the 2010 guidelines effectively restrain the prosecutorial discretion of line lawyers and ensure consistency in applying the leniency policies.…”
Section: Background and Prior Researchsupporting
confidence: 91%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As a result, many SEC lawyers that were trying to make a name for themselves became aggressive in getting companies to pay money and punishing them; this is likely one reason why prior to 2010, cooperative firms had a higher likelihood of receiving a sanction from the SEC. This is consistent with the evidence in DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015) that line lawyers build "human capital." However, by centralizing the approval authority for cooperation tools, the 2010 guidelines effectively restrain the prosecutorial discretion of line lawyers and ensure consistency in applying the leniency policies.…”
Section: Background and Prior Researchsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…SeeRobinson and Bain (2017) 6. This is because the 2001 program only outlined cooperative actions that made the firm eligible for leniency, and it allowed SEC line lawyers to apply the guidelines inconsistently (with no manual), thereby exploiting cooperative firms (DeHaan,Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal 2015).7 In our private conversation with a former senior SEC official (who requested anonymity), s/he revealed that after the SEC published the full-text of cooperation cases and agreements online as illustrative examples, defense lawyers in…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, we acknowledge that the CFRM database is subject to its own potential selection bias (Kedia and Rajgopal [], deHaan et al. []), a limitation that readers should keep in mind when interpreting our results.…”
Section: The Sample and Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Related to this, private law firms defending companies targeted by the SEC actually hire harsher prosecutors, though this result is not defendant-specific [deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal, 2015].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%