The Reward for Good Timing: Cohort Effects and Earnings Functions for Brazilian Males

Behrman, Jere R.; Birdsall, Nancy

doi:10.2307/1928159

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…The specifications of the production function (2) imply that wages and average level of human capital are positively correlated as in Lucas (1988). Such a relationship has been tested for Brazil by Behrman and Birdsall (1988), who show that cohort variables affect wages. We define the wage premium, denoted by Δ, as the difference between skilled, (7), and unskilled, (6), wages:…”

Section: The Modelsupporting

confidence: 81%

Explaining cross‐country differences in policy response to child labour

Dessy¹,

Vencatachellum²

2003

Canadian J of Economics

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We develop a model of child labour where poverty and inequality combine to determine policy response to child labour. If there are strategic complementarities between parents' decisions to educate their children and firms' technology choice, multiple school-enrolment equilibria arise. Only rich countries and those that are not too' poor and have a low wealth inequality benefit from adopting child labour laws. This is because such laws commit an economy with either of those initial conditions to the full school-enrolment equilibrium which Pareto-dominates all other equilibria. Moreover, wealth redistribution is not sufficient to eliminate child labour. JEL Classification: I20, O33Une explication des diffeÂrences d'un pays aÁ l'autre dans la reÂaction des politiques au pheÂnomeÁne du travail des enfants. Les auteurs deÂ veloppent un modeÁ le de travail des enfants dans lequel les niveaux de pauvreteÂ et d'ineÂ galiteÂ se combinent pour deÂ terminer les politiques. Si des compleÂ mentariteÂ s strateÂ giques existent entre les deÂ cisions des parents d'eÂ duquer leurs enfants et le choix de technologie des entreprises, de nombreux eÂ quilibres impliquant divers niveaux d'inscription aÁ l'eÂ cole sont possibles. Seuls les pays riches, et ceux qui ne sont pas « trop » pauvres ou qui ont un degreÂ d'ineÂ galiteÂ de la richesse relativement bas, tirent profit de lois reÂ glementant le travail des enfants. C'est le cas parce que de telles lois engagent une eÂ conomie qui a ces caracteÂ ristiques aÁ se diriger vers un eÂ quilibre d'inscription totale des enfants aÁ l'eÂ cole. Dans ces cas, il s'agit d'un eÂ quilibre qui domine au sens de Pareto tous les autres eÂ quilibres. On note de plus que la redistribution de la richesse ne suffit pas pour eÂ liminer le travail des enfants.We thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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Section: The Modelsupporting

confidence: 81%

Explaining cross‐country differences in policy response to child labour

Dessy¹,

Vencatachellum²

2003

Canadian J of Economics

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“…11 For this reason we put a parametric structure on the cohort effects and model these using a linear spline function with knots in the birth cohort years 1931, 1936, 1941, 1946, 1951, 1956, 1961, 1966and 1971 Several studies have examined cohort effects on wages and returns to schooling and experience (Welch, 1979;Behrman and Birdsall, 1988). For instance, Welch (1979) examines the effects of cohort size on wages and find significant effects-with differences in the effects across education groups-and also shows that cohort effects decline over the career, suggesting that part of the cohort effects are transient.…”

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confidence: 99%

Permanent and transitory wages of British men, 1975–2001: year, age and cohort effects

Kalwij¹,

Alessie²

2007

J of Applied Econometrics

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SUMMARYWe examine the mean and variance-covariance structure of log-wages over calendar time and the life cycle of British men, hereby controlling for birth cohort effects. We attribute the strong increase in mean log-wage during the 1980s and 1990s to a rise in mean log-wage with the year of birth. This rise is diminishing with the year of birth, which implies lower wage inequality between cohorts with the year of birth. Wage inequality has increased during the 1980s and early 1990s and remained fairly stable in the second half of the 1990s. The year effects, however, show increasing wage inequality up to 2001, mainly due to a strong rise in transitory wage inequality. Transitory wages are strongly correlated over time and an increase in transitory wage inequality therefore has highly persistent inequality consequences. The stable wage inequality in the second half of the 1990s is attributed to lower within-cohort wage inequality for the younger cohorts. The age effects show that permanent wage inequality increases with age, in particular up to age 30 and over age 50.

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“…Another explanation emphasizes the conditions of the labor market at the time of a cohort's entry. Behrman and Birdsall (1988) identify such a cohort effect for returns to education for Brazil. The idea that labor market conditions during the early years of a person's career are critical for his or her human capital accumulation is very intuitive.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reversal of Fortunes: The Rise and Fall of Lifetime Earnings of Iranian Men

Salehi‐Isfahani

Marku

2010

SSRN Journal

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. I. IntroductionIran has experienced huge shocks to its economy in the last 3 decades. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was followed by an 8-year bloody war with Iraq and the collapse of oil prices in 1986. In this article, we ask how individuals and families have fared through these tumultuous times. We compare individuals' lifetime earnings and consumption before and after the revolution by following cohorts of individuals over time. Looking at the well-being of cohorts offers a deeper understanding of changes in welfare than the common reference to average incomes. Average economic indicators tell us how things are at any point in time but do not reflect well what individuals and families experience over a lifetime. As Deaton (1997, 117) has remarked, "Questions about gainers and losers from economic development can be conveniently addressed by following cohorts over time." We are particularly interested in the fate of the younger cohorts who reached the critical age of entry into the labor market and family formation at the time of the revolution in 1979 and the start of the war with Iraq in 1980. The entire first decade of the revolution is marked by strong ideological fervor and economic decline. Cultural, social, and economic factors at critical ages influence cohorts for a lifetime. "Traumatic episodes like war and revolution," writes Ryder (1965, 851), "may become the foci of crystallization of the mentality of a cohort." The experience of the cohorts of Iranians who suffered

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The Reward for Good Timing: Cohort Effects and Earnings Functions for Brazilian Males

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

Explaining cross‐country differences in policy response to child labour

Explaining cross‐country differences in policy response to child labour

Permanent and transitory wages of British men, 1975–2001: year, age and cohort effects

Reversal of Fortunes: The Rise and Fall of Lifetime Earnings of Iranian Men

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