The rigidity of a basic attitudinal frame.

Watson, W. S.; Hartmann, George W.

doi:10.1037/h0057067

Cited by 74 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…To paraphrase Durkheim (1895), socially engaged beliefs and attitudes are not social because they are common or imitated, but are rather common or imitated because they are socially engaged 7 . Thus early American social psychologists explained the distinctive beliefs and attitudes of different occupational, political, and religious groups in terms of their social engagement (Bogardus, 1924; Edwards, 1941; Watson & Hartmann, 1939). They also explained common prejudices in these terms: for example, they explained the then common prejudice against black persons in terms of the social adoption of a negative attitude towards black persons, rather than in terms of interaction with black persons.…”

Section: Intrinsically Social Attitudes and Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

Greenwood¹

2011

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

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Moral psychology has come a long way from the philosophically informed and empirically grounded moral developmental theories of Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969 and Gilligan (1982), and moral psychology and moral philosophy have been enormously enriched by recent empirical findings and pioneering theoretical explorations in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and individual and social psychology and psychopathology (for a useful review see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c. I wholeheartedly endorse the joint enrichment and interpenetration of academic disciplines exhibited by the best works in this recent research tradition, despite some qualifications about the intellectual overreach of some recent moral psychological theories based upon it. In this paper I focus on one aspect of this recent work in moral psychology and philosophy, namely its impoverished treatment of the social dimensions of moral psychology, despite the common appeal to the findings of experimental social psychology.

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Section: Intrinsically Social Attitudes and Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

Greenwood¹

2011

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

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“…The three above-described studies constitute only the core of support for the selective learning phenomenon. Additional supporting studies have been published by Alper and Korchin (1952), Clark (1940), Edwards (1941), Taft (19S4), and Watson and Hartman (1939).…”

Section: Ohio State Universitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Attitude and selective learning: Where are the phenomena of yesteryear?

Greenwald¹,

Sakumura²

1967

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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In 3 experiments, Ss' attitudes on United States involvement in Vietnam were not found to affect learning of relevant propagandistic information. This was true (a) for measures of incidental as well as of intentional learning, and (b) for Ss aware that they were selected on the basis of their preexisting attitudes as well as for those who were unaware. Further, no reliable relationship between judged prior familiarity with information and subsequent learning was obtained. However, statements unsympathetic to United States involvement in Vietnam, a category with which Ss were relatively unfamiliar, were reliably better learned than those supporting involvement. This finding, together with supplementary novelty ratings on the experimental information, led to the conclusion that information novelty may enhance learning of propagandistic information.

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“…From this perspective, social attitudes, for example, were conceived as attitudes oriented to the represented attitudes of members of social groups—as attitudes “prescribed” by group membership (Katz & Schank, 1938). Thus occupational, political and religious attitudes were characterized as attitudes held by members of occupational, political, and religious groups because (and on condition that) other members of such social groups are represented as holding these attitudes (Bogardus, 1924b; Edwards, 1941; Watson & Hartmann, 1939). Analogously, social prejudices, such as negative attitudes towards blacks, were held to be social because they are socially learned: they are learned by reference to the attitudes of members of represented social groups, not by reference to empirically discriminated properties of black persons (Faris, 1925).…”

Section: The Lost Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Happened to the “Social” in Social Psychology?*

Greenwood¹

2004

J Theory Soc Behav

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This article describes the historical abandonment of the distinctive conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior embraced by American social psychologists in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is suggested that part of the reason why the original conception of the social was abandoned by American psychologists was because of its association with theories of the "group mind," the apparent threat it posed to cherished principles of rationality and autonomy, and the impoverished conception of the social inherited from European crowd theorists that came to inform the experimental study of social groups. It is suggested that while these factors partly explain the neglect of the social in American social psychology, none represent particularly good reasons for abandoning the original conception of the social. Consequently there are in principle no impediments to the revival of the theoretical and experimental study of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior in contemporary American social psychology.In this paper I address and suggest tentative answers to a puzzling historical question: why was the original conception of social psychological phenomena embraced by early American social psychologists progressively neglected and eventually abandoned as the twentieth century developed? In this short paper I don't expect to be able to persuade many of the virtues of the original conception, or of my historical explanation of its neglect. However, I do hope to encourage some to reflect critically on the peculiar history of social psychology, and to reconsider the justification for contemporary conceptions of the social psychological. THE LOST WORLDIn the early decades of the twentieth century, American social psychologists (in both departments of psychology and sociology) held a distinctive conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior. Social cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as forms of cognition, emotion and behavior engaged because and on condition that other members of social groups are represented as engaging these (or other) forms of cognition, emotion and behavior in similar circumstances ( Bogardus). Social cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as psychological states and behavior engaged socially : that is, by reference to the represented psychology and behavior of members of social groups. In contrast, individual cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as cognition, emotion and behavior engaged individually : that is, for reasons or causes independent of the represented psychology and behavior of members of social groups.These distinctions may be illustrated by reference to a concrete example drawn from early American social psychology. Roger Schanck (1932) studied the preferences for forms of baptism among Methodists and Baptists. Among the Methodists,

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The rigidity of a basic attitudinal frame.

Cited by 74 publications

References 0 publications

On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

Attitude and selective learning: Where are the phenomena of yesteryear?

What Happened to the “Social” in Social Psychology?*

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