The risk of viral transmission in feed: What do we know, what do we do?

Dee, Scott; Niederwerder, Megan C.; Patterson, Gil; Cochrane, R. A.; Jones, Clifford L. W.; Diel, Diego G.; Brockhoff, Egan; Nelson, Eric; Spronk, Gordon; Sundberg, Paul

doi:10.1111/tbed.13606

Cited by 20 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In future work it would be pivotal to include indirect contact networks such as feed deliveries and mortality management through dead pickups (Porphyre et al, 2020), which would allow PRRSV to spread throughout multilayer networks, for example. This will likely shed light on other routes involved in PRRSV spread (Dee et al, 2020).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling the transmission and vaccination strategy for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus

Galvis

Prada

Jones

et al. 2020

Preprint

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14 15 In the monitoring of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSv), 16 knowledge about between-farm transmission dynamics is still lacking. Our objective was 17 to assess the relative contribution of between-farm PRRSv transmission routes through a 18 mechanistic epidemiological model calibrated with PRRSv occurrence, identify risk 19 areas, and estimate the impact of immunization strategies in the disease spread. We 20 developed a mathematical model of PRRSv transmission accounting for spatial 21 proximity, pig movements, and re-breaks in sow farms, parametrized on data collected 22 routinely by commercial pig farms. We then used the model to simulate the weekly 23 frequency of cases and built risk maps, and compared with the observed cases. We 24 simulated the implementation of two immunization strategies (preventive and reactive) to 25 mitigate the between-farm transmission. Our results indicated for sow and GDU farms' 26 local spread on average was above 60%, while for nurseries between-farm movements 27 represented 83% of transmissions and in finisher farms it was distributed almost 50% 28 local and 50% between-farm movement, the model allowed reproduce the weekly 29 frequency of observed cases and the risk maps built allowed the identification of 30 observed cases in the space. The increase in vaccine efficacy was the most important 31 parameter to mitigate between-farm transmission. Also, the implementation of 32 immunization by a preventive and reactive strategy combined had the better result to 33 mitigate between-farm transmission than implement these strategies individually. These 34 immunization strategies had a better performance with the use of rigorous protocols, such 35

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling the transmission and vaccination strategy for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus

Galvis

Prada

Jones

et al. 2020

Preprint

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“…In addition to biosecurity and sourcing considerations, physical and chemical treatments of feed or ingredients can be tools for risk mitigation of ASFV. Implementing feed quarantine [ 54 ], or storage of ingredients after import from high-risk countries and regions, is one strategy intended to allow virus decay prior to incorporation of the ingredients into swine diets. For example, ASFV half-lives [ 61 ] were recently used to provide holding time information to U.S. swine producers for 99.99% degradation of ASFV in high-risk feed ingredients [ 83 ].…”

Section: Physical Mitigation Methods For Asfv In Feedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Once feed and ingredients were identified as novel routes for transboundary viral disease spread, defining feed risk for other foreign animal diseases (FAD), including ASFV, emerged as a priority for the U.S. swine industry [ 54 ]. Historical introductions and spread of ASFV into new countries or regions have had epidemiological associations with contaminated feed in the absence of swill or infectious food waste containing pork.…”

Section: Introduction Of Feed Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk and Mitigation of African Swine Fever Virus in Feed

Niederwerder

2021

Animals

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Since the 2013 introduction of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus into the United States (U.S.), feed and feed ingredients have been recognized as potential routes for the introduction and transmission of foreign animal diseases of swine. Feed ingredients for swine diets are commodities traded worldwide, and the U.S. imports thousands of metric tons of feed ingredients each year from countries with circulating foreign animal diseases. African swine fever (ASF) is the most significant foreign animal disease threat to U.S. swine production, and the recent introduction of ASF into historically negative countries has heightened the risk for further spread. Laboratory investigations have characterized the stability of the ASF virus (ASFV) in feed ingredients subjected to transoceanic shipment conditions, ASFV transmissibility through the natural consumption of plant-based feed, and the mitigation potential of certain feed additives to inactivate ASFV in feed. This review describes the current knowledge of feed as a risk for swine viruses and the opportunities for mitigating the risk to protect U.S. pork production and the global swine population from ASF and other foreign animal diseases.

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“…While the primary focus has been on the risk of illegal entry of pork products, along with travellers from ASFV-positive countries (Ito et al, 2020;Taylor et al, 2019), the possibility of ASFV entry via the importation of contaminated feed ingredients continues to gain recognition, based on a growing body of scientific evidence (Dee et al, 2018(Dee et al, , 2020Niederwerder et al, 2019;Stoian et al, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantification of soya‐based feed ingredient entry from ASFV‐positive countries to the United States by ocean freight shipping and associated seaports

Patterson¹,

Niederwerder

Spronk

et al. 2020

Transbound Emerg Dis

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African swine fever virus (ASFV) can survive in soya-based products for 30 days with T ½ ranging from 9.6 to 12.9 days in soya bean meals and soya oil cake. As the United States imports soya-based products from several ASFV-positive countries, knowledge of the type and quantity of these specific imports, and their ports of entry (POE), is necessary information to manage risk. Using the data from the International Trade Commission Harmonized Tariff Schedule website in conjunction with pivot tables, we analysed imports across air, land and sea POE of soya-based products from 43 ASFV-positive countries to the United States during 2018 and 2019. In 2018, 104,366 metric tons (MT) of soya-based products, specifically conventional and organic soya bean meal, soya beans, soya oil cake and soya oil were imported from these countries into the United States via seaports only. The two largest suppliers were China (52.7%, 55,034 MT) and the Ukraine (42.9%, 44,775 MT). In 2019, 73,331 MT entered the United States and 54.7% (40,143 MT) came from the Ukraine and 8.4% (6,182 MT) from China. Regarding POE, 80.9%-83.2% of soya-based imports from China entered the United States at the seaports of San Francisco, CA, and Seattle, WA, while 89.4%-100% entered from the Ukraine via the seaports of New Orleans, LA, and Charlotte, NC. Analysis of five-year trends (2015-2019) of the volume of soya imports from China indicated reduction over time (with a noticeably sharp decrease between 2018 and 2019), and seaport utilization was consistent. In contrast, volume remained high for Ukrainian soya imports, and seaport utilization was inconsistent. Overall, this exercise introduced a new approach to collect objective data on an important risk factor, providing researchers, government officials and industry stakeholders a means to objectively identify and quantify potential channels of foreign animal disease entry into the United States.

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The risk of viral transmission in feed: What do we know, what do we do?

Abstract: This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Cited by 20 publications

References 35 publications

Modeling the transmission and vaccination strategy for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus

Modeling the transmission and vaccination strategy for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus

Risk and Mitigation of African Swine Fever Virus in Feed

Quantification of soya‐based feed ingredient entry from ASFV‐positive countries to the United States by ocean freight shipping and associated seaports

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