2023
DOI: 10.1101/2023.03.16.532935
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The role of airborne particles in the epidemiology of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity avian influenza virus in commercial poultry production units

Abstract: Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 320 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1 positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have been detected as geographical clusters, raising questions around lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIVs strains. However, the risk of ai… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…Influenza A virus, which is a threat to both animal and public health because of its ability to change, reassort and cause pandemics ( 22 ), has also been detected in air samples from rooms of experimentally infected pigs ( 23 ), in air samples inside animal buildings and in the exhaust air from infected farms and at 1 mile from infected farms ( 24 ), highlighting the potential for aerosol transmission in pigs and between farms. Furthermore, the airborne spread of the HPAI virus was also implicated in the spread of avian influenza under certain conditions ( 25 27 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Influenza A virus, which is a threat to both animal and public health because of its ability to change, reassort and cause pandemics ( 22 ), has also been detected in air samples from rooms of experimentally infected pigs ( 23 ), in air samples inside animal buildings and in the exhaust air from infected farms and at 1 mile from infected farms ( 24 ), highlighting the potential for aerosol transmission in pigs and between farms. Furthermore, the airborne spread of the HPAI virus was also implicated in the spread of avian influenza under certain conditions ( 25 27 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%