Selective attention to 1 of 2 overlapping objects was assessed in a cuing paradigm. Participants detected or identified targets that appeared in 1 of 6 possible target locations (3 on each object). Significant cuing effects for the simple detection of such targets using both reaction time and sensitivity measures of performance were found. Cuing effects were consistently greater when the participants were required to identify some aspect of the target even when the tasks (detection vs. identification) were equated for overall performance level. These differences in cuing effects between tasks were much reduced if the target locations were no longer grouped into 2 objects. It is suggested that identical stimuli can elicit differing attentional mechanisms depending on task type (rather than task difficulty) and that these mechanisms differ in the nature of the representation of the visual world. A flash of lightning by night, the report of a firearm, the sudden prick of a knife, or a violent internal pain, all these for the moment so occupy our notice that everything else becomes feeble or is banished. (Bradley, 1886, p. 306) Bradley's (1886) quote summarizes people's introspection that when they are attending to one thing, they become less aware of other things. Modern experimental psychologists have devoted much work to defining the details of this general statement. However, there are still fundamental issues that have yet to be resolved. In this article we attempt to address some of them: What constitutes the "thing" of people's attention (an area of space or an object)? Are all tasks affected by attention, and, if so, are they affected equally? Are there differences in attending to something by a deliberate act of will versus when this something automatically draws attention to itself?. To what extent does the difficulty of the task act to determine the effects of attention? Such questions have importance not only in producing theoretical accounts of attentional processes but also for their practical implications. For instance, there is an increasing use of head-up displays (HUDs) in both aviation and driving situations (Sojourner & Antin, 1990; Tufano, 1997; Weintraub & Ensing, 1992; Wickens & Long, 1995). HUDs attempt to overlay information relevant to the user onto the image received from the outside world. The hope is that the two images will fall onto the same parts of the retina and thus time might be saved in switching gaze and accommodation between the two images. However, it might be that